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A. BACKGROUND  
More than a decade before the 9-11 terrorist attack, the Coalition Forces 
serving in Iraq and Kuwait were faced with the potentially deadly uncertainties of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and environmental hazards. The exact threat 
after the initial days of the Gulf War was unknown and the demand for immediate 
and accurate assessments of the potential of WMD threats was imminent. A reliable 
capability was desperately needed for providing near-real time predictions of the 
hazardous materials present in Iraq and neighboring countries. Operation Desert 
Storm accentuated the need for an automated hazard predication tools on-site for 
use by the decision maker with rapid and acceptably accurate results. Given the lack 
of tools in theater that accounted for terrain, weather, agent and delivery, the 
standard of acceptable accuracy was not very strict. The commanders needed a tool 
that would approximate the general exposure to hazardous materials using contours 
of threat as opposed to the current generalized area assessment available through 
the ATP-45 triangle method.  Best available data became a mantra that resulted in a 
very general plot that rarely facilitated the effective evaluation of course of action or 
decision-making involving prediction of collateral damage. 
During the military campaign and in the aftermath during the cleanup, 
predictions of the collateral effects of potential WMD and environmental hazards 
were inefficient and untimely. Without an integrated tool on-site, hazard prediction 
analysis was conducted through a slow and inconsistent reachback process 
conducted at the Defense Nuclear Agency (a predecessor organization to the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)).  Analysis was performed inconsistently 
depending on the skills and techniques of the analyst on shift. The forward units sent 
request for information (RFI) back to the DTRA Headquarters, and then in most 
cases were forced to wait up to 12 hours for the results to be sent back to Theater.  
And, when the results were returned quite often the results did not answer the 
nuances of the emergent situation.  
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This experience prompted DTRA to develop a collection of tools for on-site 
targeting, consequence assessment, hazard prediction and collateral effects. The 
tools were designed to operate as stand-alone applications, each loaded on the local 
machine with databases locally managed. There were two primary tools developed 
by DTRA that addressed these requirements from 1991-1996: Munitions Effects 
Assessment (MEA) and Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC). 
MEA was developed under a Counter-Proliferation Advanced Concept and Testing 
Demonstration (CP ACTD) effort, designed as a targeting tool to provide attack and 
collateral effects predictions. HPAC was developed to provide prediction data on 
hazardous release of chemical, biological and nuclear incidents, using weather, 
terrain, agent, and transport data.  The Initial focus addressed the shortcomings of 
the recent conflict as identified by a post-conflict study conducted by IDA shortly 
after the Gulf War. An excerpt of the DIA report stated1: 
.... continued concern about the inability to describe the many variables 
of the agent-munition release mechanism. The panel agrees with the 
CIA that “huge uncertainties remain” in the number of rockets present 
for destruction and the number of those rockets destroyed. Among the 
other major variables for which there remains much uncertainty are 
total quantity of agent released, mechanism of release, and purity of 
agent. 
 
B. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis outlines the author’s initial design and research and then 
subsequent efforts by DTRA that lead to the development of the “Integrated 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Toolset” (IWMDT). This thesis investigates and 
reports on the software effort and the associated software systems engineering 
implications. 
This chapter gave a brief introduction to the problem and the motivation of the 
research. Chapter II presents an overview of the supporting technologies. Chapter III 
                                            
1 Agent Purity comment – IDA report DefenseLINK News Release, Reference Number 681-96, 20 
December 1996. 
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documents the system requirements and Chapter IV describes the architectural 
design of the IWMDT software. Chapter V discusses the requirements for 
configuration management, validation, verification, and accreditation, as well as 
system and data security for the IWMDT software. Chapter VI contains the lessons 
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II. ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGY 
A. ANALYSIS OF WAR HAZARD ASSESSMENT TECHNOLOGY 
Meeting the immediate Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 
Effects (CBRNE) needs of the warfighter, and establishing methods for applying 
technology to meet their requirements became an important goal for DTRA after the 
Gulf War of 1991. During the war, there was a viable threat of CBRNE casualties 
due to Saddam Hussein’s previous use of such weapons2. Without an automated 
hazard prediction capability and integrated targeting system, the only method that 
commanders were able to employ to determine threat areas and threat levels was 
through the use of a generalized CBRNE threat triangle. The triangle referred to as 
an ATP45 prediction3, accounts for direction and predicted length of a CBRNE 
threat. Because the manual triangle method is designed for gross area prediction it 
is limited in detailed assessments affecting specific areas of operations, the 
specificity of the data is critical for making decisions that potentially will impact 
locals, enemy forces and your own forces on the battlefield.  
The identified requirement for an on-site analysis capability led to the 
development of HPAC in 1991. Drawing from over fifty years of CBRNE excellence 
and scientific research4, DTRA transformed research projects and scientific studies 
into a software tool to meet these critical requirements.  In 1991, after the Gulf War, 
lessons learned and formal reviews identified requirements and technology gaps 
that needed immediate attention. DTRA developed HPAC to address the technology 
gaps that left our troops exposed to potential CBRNE threats during and immediately 
after the Gulf War. Using this tool allowed commanders to more accurately predict 
collateral damage and hazard area predictions, and provide greater safety for the 
troops. 
                                            
2 http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/n01232003_200301234.html, May 2004 
3 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/6-20-30/Ref.htm, May 2004 
4 http://www.dtra.mil, May 2000 
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From 1991 to 1999, DTRA continuously improved the HPAC tool, issuing 
releases approximately every six months. Gradually the code was re-engineered 
leading to a major paradigm shift in 1999. In 1999, DTRA made a significant 
architecture modification by developing a design based on new distributed object 
architecture methods (Figure 1). In a paper published by Ronald W. Lee in Aug 
20025 the HPAC architecture is described as having several system level 
requirements, these requirements are valuable supporting technology improvement 
that led to the IWMDT concept. Mr. Lee’s general outline explains the attributes of 
the HPAC structure as: portability - platform independence, extensibility - allow 
addition of new capabilities to a deployed system, deployment - flexibility for a range 
of situations and environments, support - client-server operation, and expedited 
integration of HPAC components in other systems.  More detailed analysis of HPAC 







Figure 1.   Redesign of HPAC (ORNL – 1999.) 
 
 
B. ANALYSIS OF TARGET ASSESSMENT TECHNOLOGY 
While HPAC addresses the dispersion and transport of agents, Munitions 
Effectiveness Assessment (MEA) integrates the dispersion with the structural and 
weapon target dynamics of targeting.  
 
                                            
5  http://wigner.cped.ornl.gov/HPAC/info/paper.tm.pdf 
 7
The United States European Command (EUCOM) under the Department of 
Defense’s (DoD) Counterproliferation Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 
(CP ACTD) commissioned MEA. Specifically designed for deliberate and crisis 
planning, MEA allows users to design three-dimensional models of above- and 
below-ground facilities and simulate end-to-end attacks using precision guided air-
to-ground and other types of munitions of conventional and WME sites. Though 
initially designed to assist warfighters in visualizing and weaponeering fixed targets, 
the tool was later integrated with HPAC for an integrated attack/dispersion solution.  
The new integrated application was entitled, Integrated Munitions Effectiveness 
Assessment (IMEA).  Most target types can be specified to contain WMD, in those 
cases any resulting expulsion is passed to HPAC for transport and dispersion. Later 
in Section IV.G of this thesis a use case and description of information exchange will 
demonstrate this process. 
IMEA uses fast running, physics based algorithms to predict optimal 
weaponeering solution. Resulting cratering, fragmenting, blast damage and 
collateral effects are presented to the user as probability and extent of effect 
solutions. The IMEA application is quite complex and provides a very high degree of 
flexibility in design of targets and sites. Using a hierarchical data structure, 
presented to the user in a tree structure as shown in Figure 2, the application and 
the user maintain a consistent and traceable task flow.  
The arrows point out the use of nodes and tree structures for databases. 
Arrow 1 is the top-level “database” level, arrow 2 is the “site” level, arrow 3 is the 
“target” level and arrow 4 is the “model”. Through the use of this hierarchical 




Figure 2.   IMEA Screen Shot.  
 
 
C. ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGIES 
Developing tools in the 1990s was considerably different than developing 
tools in the 2000s. This difference is largely due to the application of technologies 
and learned experiences that have improved the engineering of the source code 
and the exchange methods. So it follows that tools developed in the 1990s and 
reengineered in the 2000s are often more complicated than newer tools with pure 
2000 technology and design methods applied. But, the transformation of 
capabilities from the 1990s versions of IMEA and HPAC to the 2000 architecture is 
being accomplished much smoother than would be expected. Much of the success 
is due to the consistent requirements, the unparalleled cooperation of over five 
companies, and strong leadership. Before we talk about the specific methods 
implemented by the team it is wise to define a few processes and efforts that 
impacted this process.  
1. Evolution And Revolution Of Technology 
When developing innovative technologies, the methods and processes are 
often as innovative as the product that results from the effort. Though there are 
clearly established disciplines that are followed, it is the application of the gray 






nature unique, even the “experts” do not agree on the best path to follow to create a 
new capability. Some say the solution to solving hotly contested concepts such as 
band-width limits, security limits, concurrent processing, shared common data etc. 
is to invoke evolution; others say we need a revolution. But what is the difference in 
the two, and why do we care? 
If the goal of the technology transformation is to exercise a gradual process in 
which something changes into a different and usually more complex or better form, 
then choosing evolution is most appropriate. If the goal is to find a drastic and far-
reaching change in the way of thinking and behaving, then opting for a revolution 
is more appropriate. Though the definitions of these words leave the reader with a 
“who cares” attitude the effect of the choice is actually quite serious. Choosing to 
revolutionize an industry is usually painful, long-term and costly. On the other hand 
the process of slow and gradual change is not a good choice if the industry 
influences human lives and failure to act boldly may lead to unnecessary suffering 
and/or death. Additionally many times the slow process can result in higher costs 
and less directed results due to the longer period of performance and the loss of 
momentum when lasting longer periods. 
In the case of software development providing CBRNE assessments, the 
industry borrowed time because the probability of large-scale CBRNE attack was 
considered low prior to 1991. After the Gulf War, the author discovered that DTRA 
choose to invoke a hybrid of both revolution and evolution.  Fifty years of 
experience clearly warned DTRA of the impact of pre-mature implementation of 
tools, but current demands necessitated immediate development to meet the needs 
identified in the War. Because of unique situations, DTRA had the two spirals of 
change acting in harmony to allow internal revolution in support of evolution goals 
and internal evolution in support of revolution goals.  
Regardless of the spiral method of evolution or revolution, the goal is to 
produce a product without unduly affecting the user operational tempo and yet 
providing near real time assessments. From 1991 to 1999, HPAC and IMEA 
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provided a core prediction capability and targeting solution that is best 
characterized as a revolution in CBRNE prediction. From 1999 to 2003, HPAC 
development could be best characterized as an evolution, as it evolved into an 
open architecture. By allowing more modular development and incremental module 
and functional improvements, the capability was improved and the user base 
expanded. Starting in 2003, a revolution once again occurred as new technology 
made web-service architectures possible. The new approach to delivering 
accessible and visible data provided a much greater level of interoperability and 
rapid collaboration of users, decision makers and subject matter experts (SMEs).  
A common understanding of the processes is a good start, but there are still 
many issues that need to be resolved before this revolution becomes solid enough 
for widespread use. The current transformation is analogous to the 1990s effort from 
primarily mainframe architectures to the client/server architectures so prevalent in 
the last decade. The migration from the client/server methods of the 1990s to the 
use of web-services in 2004 is worthy of a short discussion as it lays a foundation for 
the migration of HPAC and IMEA to the current tool IWMDT.  
Just as the vision of lowering the costs from the mainframe to the client/server 
was a noble yet naive vision, history may repeat itself in the web-services area. In 
the 1990s scenario, the cost for MIPS (millions of instructions per second) was 
lowered, but the overhead associated with the maintenance of the high count of 
machines was increased.  Additionally a bevy of applications were released in the 
maturing of the client/server movement that further fractured the industry and 
complicated the integration of information and processes that were critical to the 
user’s success. Once again as we watch the proliferation of web based services, a 
whole plethora of services will be offered to meet the needs of a naive user market 
anxious to be revolutionist and to gain an advantage over competitors. Which 




The good news is that the standard protocols are gaining support from 
industrial leaders such as Microsoft and Oracle. The bad news is that though many 
of the tools and services are common, the implementation of many other services is 
still evolving. This evolution is sure to cause implementation issues as web-services 
are created on one vendor’s tools and then deployed on another vendor’s hardware.  
This uncharted sea of technology will either be circumnavigated as the 
client/server template suggests with a glut of providers competing for the survival of 
the fittest, or a new paradigm will emerge. Signs are positive that a new paradigm 
might prevail. This new paradigm will be characterized by widespread contractor 
teaming, and shared data and application processes across common information 
grids. This paradigm has been active and improving at DTRA for the last two years 
in the IWMDT program.  
Pete Lindstrom, Director of Security Strategies at the Framingham, Mass.-
based Hurwitz Group, says, "In a lot of ways, web-services are all about the 
interoperability problems we have today between systems," he points out. Thus, it's 
only natural that at first there would be these kinds of issues.   Respectfully, the 
author offers that the real issue is not the interoperability of the software and 
hardware, but the competitive environment that capitalism creates. In the early to 
late 1980s and continuing into the late 1990s, the government encouraged lengthy 
competitive trials that led to a “survival of the fittest” marketplace.  
This process was intended to provide the government the best product at a 
competitive price, but the process led to costs rising to the contractors. This caused 
the cost of each of the contracts to rise in an effort to meet the overhead associated 
with preparing the proposals and in some cases delivering elaborate prototypes. 
This method encouraged the contractors to work against each other instead of with 
each other, and the government paid the price for their competition.  
In the early 2000s a very positive trend is prevailing at DTRA, this trend 
involves very complicated partnering and collaborative efforts between competitors.  
If this trend continues the norm will include closely integrated solutions and the 
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anomaly will be “survival of the fittest”. The anticipation will mount as the industry 
decides if they will follow the trend of government contractors, or develop a less 
effective open bid process that has proven ineffective. By partnering the contractors 
in an Indefinite Quantity Indefinite Delivery (IDIQ) contract each of the companies is 
assured a certain amount of market share, and the incentive to “cooperate and 
graduate” is greatly improved. 
 
D. INTEGRATION OF TECHNOLOGY AND REQUIREMENTS 
Mid-year 2000, the author arrived at DTRA. Eager to serve and yet limited in 
his skills and background, contracting and software engineering education was 
immediately necessary. This education came through the Naval Postgraduate 
Software Engineering Masters Degree program and on the job training as program 
manager and government lead on three contracts. The author mentions these two 
influences because without the coordinated occurrence of these two influences 
many of the programs and events that occurred in DTRA from 2000-2004 would not 
have been possible.  
Daily across the government, military officers are given the task of serving as 
Contracting Office Technical Representative (COTR) with little or no formal training. 
This responsibility can be quite challenging to the school trained program manager, 
to the novice it can be overwhelming. When the author was assigned this task, he 
was the later. And as such, he had nothing to guide his decisions except common 
sense and ethical behavior. This was noble but hardly the stuff that successful 
COTRs are made of.  Further complicating this task were the many other 
responsibilities that are expected of military officers.  If it were not for the excellent 
instruction and practical application that NPS offers in the distant learning program, 
the task may have been too large. But, able to draw on the professional knowledge 
of the NPS staff, the author charged the hill of ignorance with confidence, 
constantly improving his knowledge and applying the classroom instruction. 
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Beginning in 2000, the author had two roles at DTRA. One role was as a 
program manager and software engineer, the other was as a warfighter and a 
CBRNE SME in direct support to Combatant Commands.  As a military warfighter 
the responsibility to provide commanders rapid, accurate and consistent CBRNE 
recommendations was a crucial part of his role. Deploying over 300 days in direct 
support of Combat Headquarters meant that decisions made as a program 
manager and engineer directly affected his ability to accomplish a wartime mission 
with the same tools he was developing.  
As the senior military CBRNE software engineer in DTRA, the author 
deployed to Central Command (CENTCOM), United States Forces Korea (USFK), 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE), European Command 
(EUCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM) two to three times each annually. On 
these deployments it was the responsibility of the DTRA SME to integrate CBRNE 
predictions and targeting planning into existing staff operations. DTRA tools were 
able to describe specific areas that contained levels of hazard, but were not able to 
tie it specifically to units or other systems within the command posts or simulation. 
This lack of integrated data would remain an issue until the 2003 development of 
HPAC-J, discussed later in Section IV.C of the thesis. 
Considering the limitations discussed above, the data that DTRA was able to 
provide was still a magnitude of quality better than other tools available. In addition, 
a more concerning immediate limitation was the deployment requirements. The tool 
accounted for so many factors, including terrain, weather, feature data, etc that the 
hard drive space requirements were in excess of 1GB. The large storage 
requirements and the requirement for administrator level access to load the 
software often were too demanding for the users to accept.   
These requirements ranged from burdensome at some commands to too 
extensive to allow DTRA to load HPAC at other sites. As the tool improved the local 
installation and operation requirements continued to escalate until in 2001 users 
demanded another tool deployment option. The only option for deployment of the 
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tool and CBRNE prediction capability was to continue the heavy burden on the 
commands or develop a system that was broadly accessible, consistently visible 
and that had very limited local requirements.  
In 2002, the author developed a software requirement document to develop a 
web-browser capability for HPAC to address the reduced requirement option. The 
original intent was to allow users to log on to a standard web-browser and access 
HPAC capabilities. After the initial intent was articulated, new technologies began to 
change the methods for providing net-centric data. The new paradigms was ideal 
for meeting the need of providing the SME tools and yet reducing the burden on the 
users.  Continued work in this area led the author and DTRA leadership to 
investigate the application of net-centric processes to assist in this transformation. 
Later in this thesis we examine some of the services, architectures, processes, and 
integrated tools that have impacted on the original vision and the IWMDT 
development effort. 
 
E. PARADIGM SHIFT – NET-CENTRIC FUSION 
Major paradigm shifts across broad communities usually result in large 
delays, major funding shortfalls and confusion until they mature. In the early 2000s a 
paradigm shift occurred across the Department of Defense, which focused on the 
application of web-services to fuse data and processes. This shift heralded by many 
over the last ten years is still evolving, but the initial shifts were smooth enough that 
the community managed it successfully.  One of the recent applications of this 
concept, which benefits IWMDT, is the Horizontal Fusion (HF) Portfolio. In Chapter 
VI “Discussion and Conclusion” of this thesis, this technology application is more 
closely examined.  
IWMDT is ensuring that all program decisions support the integration into the 
Horizontal Fusion initiative, which is a cornerstone to the Secretary of Defense vision 
of Force Transformation. Secretary Rumsfield’s vision – to “think differently and 
develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges 
 15
and to unexpected circumstances”, clearly imputes the urgency that the Department 
has to ensure warfighters and analyst have timely and accurate data. The key to this 
effort is not only the provision of data but also the method with which that data is 
handled and provided to communities of interest.  
The realization that providing processed data from subject matter experts to 
commanders was not timely or sufficient to support the necessary functions across 
the battlefield led to the development of a new paradigm for data handling. The core 
benefit of the paradigm shift is the ability to provide data to a shared space more 
timely and accurately than previously performed.  Through a “smart pull” paradigm 
applications and users are given the control to pull the data they require without 
waiting on a push by the provider. By making the data available via the Task, Post in 
Parallel, Process in Parallel, and Use in Parallel (TPPU) paradigm, the process is 
enhanced.  The diagram below illustrates the data flow and shared data process. 
For IWMDT the TPPU cycle will provide the intelligence data and integrated 
information much more rapidly allowing users to pull key data for model 
development and prediction assessments. 
 
Figure 3.   TPPU Environment (From HF Document, 2004.) 
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Previous processes required intelligence sources to process the data prior to 
posting it, and when posted it was usually stovepiped into areas that were not 
globally available. The vision of this new process is that the data will be in a shared 
space where components that adhere to the DoD standard interface documents 
request data and post data much more rapidly.  
IWMDT has a goal of meeting the requirements of the Net-Centric Horizontal 
Fusion Portfolio6 which are: make information available on a network that people 
depend on and trust, populate the network with new dynamic sources of information 
to defeat the enemy and deny the enemy advantages and exploit weaknesses.   
 
F. WEB-SERVICES  
The core of the web-services architecture is the ability of legacy applications 
to wrap modular software components in Internet communication protocols. This 
service enables legacy or non-web-enabled applications to run on a TCP/IP network, 
providing broader application use. Coupled with this simple goal are a number of 
other ancillary tasks such as automatic communication with other applications 
without human intervention, ability to deploy inside of firewalls, or run in a protected 
environment and the key is not to require a specific development tool or language. 
Figure 4 below illustrates the simple layout of the system. 
                       
Figure 4.   Web-Services Operation. 
                                            
6  http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/2004/01/0401Stenbit.pdf, May 2004 
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Key operations shown above are the magic behind web-services. The key 
operations are “publish”, “find” and “bind”.  The first operation, “publish” represents 
the XML service description that the host or service provider creates making the 
information available to other modules on the web. Using Universal Description, 
Discovery and Integration (UDDI) protocols the next operation occurs, “find,” in this 
stage the service registry readies services descriptions for execution by other 
applications. Within the “find” operation UDDI protocols provide information on 
location, linking requirements and operational use. The last operation is the “bind & 
run” or “bind”. This operation is the result of the service requestor “finding” the 
information that was “published” and binding it to allow execution. 
This activity is all possible because the data is meta-data tagged. The meta-
data tagging process is shown below in Figure 5. Shown in the upper right corner is 
the benefit to the Consumer, which includes the automated search of data, focused 
format or content data, and the automated analysis of data content determination. 
The Producer is capable providing a wider variety of data formats and multi-media 
data, which is tagged and stored as a shared asset. In addition one of the strongest 
reasons to take advantage of the meta-data standards is to allow the Developers to 
build applications that post, process, display and exchange the tagged data. The use 




Figure 5.   Meta-data process 
(From CM Plan, 2003.) 
 
G. SERVICE ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE 
The last technology to discuss here is the Service Oriented Architecture 
Protocol (SOAP). This architecture provides services that promote loosely coupled 
interactions among software agents. The general rules for the entities are: a service 
is a well-defined self-contained unit of work, service consumer uses a service by 
making requests, a service provider provides services by processing requests, and a 
contract is a platform independent specification of the service. Primary 
characteristics of the services are: services are loosely coupled, services are 
location transparent, services are dynamically bound and discoverable, services are 
composable, and lastly services are platform independent. 
To facilitate the necessary web-based services stated as goals of modern 
accessible applications and frameworks, many applications apply web services as 
an enabling technology. A primary reason that web service are selected for use in 
innovative designs is due to the platform independent, well defined, and self-
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contained unit of work methodology. The web services are implemented through the 
use of Web Services Description Language (WSDL) that provides standard ways of 
describing the contract between service consumer and provider. The publish-and-
discover mechanism is provided by UDDI, and, the transmission responsibilities are 
provided through the use of SOAP. Shown below is a common SOAP architecture 







Figure 6.   Service Oriented Architecture – IWMDT 
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III. ANALYSIS OF REQUIREMENTS 
A. LINGUISTIC DISCONTINUITY 
“When you fail to plan, you plan to fail!”  In software disciplines this typically 
means we fail to define the architecture and method in accordance with the 
stakeholders’ requirements and the engineering clarity of the requirement process. 
The elicitation of requirements when correctly applied results in a more focused and 
less costly effort. But the assurance of this result is tied to many factors, some are 
controllable and many are not. For those areas that we can control and constrain, 
there must be a common understanding of the definitions.  
Since the tower of Babel, man has spoken many languages, resulting in lost 
meaning and frustration between parties.  Professor Richard Riehle7 of Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) popularized a phrase among his students, “linguistic 
discontinuity” that addresses this phenomenon. He states: 
…. We begin a software effort by excavating the requirements, as seen 
by a client (or other engineer), in the language of that client. We 
translate that set of requirements, during analysis, into some other 
linguistic model. From there, we might impose yet other linguistic 
models based on input from other engineering disciplines. At some 
point, we create a design that attempts to make sense of the 
linguistically unique input up to this point. After several iterations, we 
think we have it right. 
 Then we pass this on to a set of developers including 
programmers and integrators, who have yet another linguistic toolbox. 
This toolbox consists of programming languages, operating systems 
languages, database languages, etc. Sometimes there is more than 
one programming language involved. Whatever the programmer 
creates is eventually translated into an executable language that only 
the computer can read with ease. Yet the programmer, during the 
debugging process, must also be able to translate the executable 
language back to his/her own code set to make sense of errors. The 
testing team often has its own linguistic model…. 
                                            
7 Richard Riehle, Naval Postgraduate, Visiting Professor, Computer Science 
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The message conveyed is, language is imperfectly exercised by 
imperfect people for imperfect reasons. But, straddled with this understanding 
we must learn to communicate effectively if not perfectly. The ability to 
capture requirements and respond to needs is limited by our understanding of 
the problem. Even if the user perfectly described his requirements the 
linguistic model employed by the engineers and other members of a 
development team would affect the results.   
A linguistic model shapes each of us, and how we translate this model affects 
what we think and hear. In most cases the translation of phrases is not dissimilar 
enough to readily affect the understanding, but even small differences in the 
definition of requirements can have 2nd and 3rd order effects. An example of how 
linguistic models can have 2nd and 3rd order effects is demonstrated by examining 
the Ancient Greeks8, and their unwillingness to use the number zero.  
The Ancient Greek mathematicians are well known for their knowledge and 
learned contributions to every aspect of modern world education. But in the midst of 
this great body of knowledge was a limiting factor that prohibited these learned men 
from achieving even greater feats.  The Greeks based their understanding of 
mathematics on geometry. This linguistic model bound them to a system that did not 
represent zero. Numbers were represented by geometric symbols and there was no 
shape for zero; or shapes for any number less than zero. Therefore, Greek 
mathematicians would not consider solving problems that are commonly solved 
today starting in middle school. These problems required the mathematician to 
evaluate zero or negative values and this was not possible in the Greek society. 
 Certainly we would not say that the Greeks were incapable of determining 
their requirements any more than we would tell a user that they are unable to 
determine their unique requirements. The Greeks chose not to have a zero, based 
on a gestalt philosophy that concluded that in math, as well as other aspects of life, 
one should not represent the existence of nothing. The Greeks thought that it is 
improper to represent “nothing” with something, if it is “nothing” it does not exist and 
                                            
8  http://saxakali.com/COLOR_ASP/discoverof.htm , 3 May 2004 
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therefore is not necessary to account for it. Any other credo would invalidate their 
philosophies and violate their system of belief that did not account for the existence 
of nothing. Scholars of other faiths that allowed for the necessity of nothing, later 
formally introduced the concept of zero or “nothing” into the Greek worldview, and 
altered mathematics forever.  
 
B. REQUIREMENT DEFINITION ANALYSIS 
As Software Engineers, we must consider the impact of linguistic models and 
their impact on user’s requirement statements. Because the user does not state a 
requirement that appears obvious to the engineer does not allow the engineer the 
license to modify the users’ requirement without consent.  Requirement definition is 
a difficult issue for engineers to broach with users and one that must be done with 
humility and an eagerness to serve the user’s needs in spite of their perceived 
innate linguistic model limitations.  With the “Greek” model in mind, we can 
appreciate that users still have a definite advantage over the engineers in the 
definition of their requirement.    
A primary role of the Software Engineer is as a facilitator of 
discussions on what is possible given technology and data availability, not as 
a pipe for the user to pass requirements through. The Software Engineer 
must have the background in applicable disciplines to linguistically enhance 
the statements made by the user without losing the intent or increasing the 
risk or cost beyond the users’ actual requirement.  
Different users in the same geographic area will have different 
requirements for the prediction and assessment of WMD incidents as shown 
in Figure 7.  The various users shown below each have unique requirements 
within the same geographic area. With an understanding of the varied 
environments, the Software Engineer can interpolate varied requirements that 
address each of the needs. 
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Figure 7.   Myriad of User Requirements.  
 
The user, the architect and the program team must share common 
understanding of the environments and the impacts required on the entities in 
the area. The effective communication of user requirements to the architect, 
and then the translation of the user requirements to the program team is 
critical. To understand the requirement in sufficient detail to develop code to 
support the incident, the requirement documents and subsequent documents 
must capture the nuances of the requirement as well as the stated 
requirements.  
In this scenario users would be expected to convey the impact of 
agents on aerial units in a different manner than other units in the area. 
Agents move through the air in wind flow and as the heat and density of air 
changes the flow obviates some of the agent while massing other agent 
particles. Obviously the contamination at higher altitudes is more of an issue 
for the aerial units, but when they land the agents may impact ground units. 
This is where the user’s requirements must be captured with clarity. The 




















The author failed to accomplish this initially when developing the program 
goals and architectural designs for IWMDT. The definition and translation success 
was affected due to miscommunication and discontinuous goals between the users 
and the author. Though the author’s intent was to clearly define a requirement for a 
single tool that would replicate all functionality of the existing HPAC tool, he 
translated a requirement for a web-services net-centric architecture to the 
development team. The result was much better than the intended goal because it 
used burgeoning technologies and enabled much broader application integration, 
but, the ineffectiveness of the translation was still proves the point of 
miscommunication and its impact on requirements. 
A primary reason the author failed to clearly articulate his requirement was his 
bi-lingual familiarity of both the warfighters operational environment and the 
programmer’s development environment. The author was too familiar with both 
environments and he failed to clarify the key terms, subsequently the development 
team assumed he understood the terms as they understood them. When the 
requirement documents were delivered to the author it was obvious that the goals 
were incongruent.  
When the author considered the possible discontinuity of the parties and 
described the intended goals and requirements in non-domain-specific terms the 
problems were largely abated. Within the specific domain (developers, users, etc) 
terms are normally commonly understood and meaning is easily transferred between 
team members, the same is typically not true outside of the specific domain. In this 
example the typical user is a military warfighter or a first responder who is rarely an 
expert at WMD. Likewise the typical developer is a C++ or Java programmer in San 
Diego CA, with little or no military experience. And the author is representative of a 
typical government lead that is expected to have thorough knowledge of both 
domains. Though this is rarely true, it is an expectation of the other two pieces of the 
team and therefore should be accounted for in the process.   
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With the shared experience and understanding of both environments it is 
incumbent on the software engineer to ensure that the WME experience, military 
experience and software engineering knowledge are seamlessly integrated. The 
author was capable of transferring meaning between all three domains and 
maintaining delineated domain specific meaning for terms, but in this case he did not 
accomplish the task early enough.  Because the government lead is the only person 
on the team that is expected to share a common understanding, they are a key to 
the effort. In most cases, the government lead is not a software engineer and is not 
prepared to accomplish this critical role. This is a subject for other papers to discuss 
the validity of the government lead nomination process. The miscommunication in 
this case actually benefited the project because it exposed the author to possibilities 
he had not considered. Most participants in the development process have one 
domain that they are an expert in and very limited knowledge of the other aspects of 
the project.  
An example of the impact of linguistic discontinuity and its impact on shared 
understanding is demonstrated with three seemingly innocent words. The three 
words, “hazards”, “thresholds” and “agents” are used to demonstrate the concept. 
These are common terms in all three domains, but each has a differing definition for 
the common phrase. To participate in the project all three must share a common 
definition of the terms. Failure to share a definition causes misunderstandings and 
discontinuity of the general and specific applications of the terms.   
When considering the phrases the WME expert thinks a contour of agent 
contamination for “hazards” and “thresholds,” and specific chemical or biological 
solutions for “agent”. The user thinks of minefields and no-go terrain for “hazard”, 
and personnel flow into the operational area for “threshold”.  The software engineers 
has yet a third use of the terms, referring to malicious code and bandwidth issues as 
they consider hazards or thresholds, and to agent-based systems for “agent.” These 
differences can cause an incongruence of the user expectation and the developed 
product, more complex terms and concepts will be further exacerbated by the 
discontinuity.  
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Professor Riehle pointed out the requirement for embedded engineering 
disciplines within the software discipline. Within the software effort for IWMDT we 
have chemical, biological, nuclear, and structural disciplines. Consistent with 
Professor Riehle’s comments and our software engineering community a respect for 
other disciplines and their respective experts is an important criterion for successful 
team-based projects.  
Professor Riehle further states, “…software has become an equal partner in 
the design of modern systems of all kinds.” The specific reference to software 
illustrates a maturity of the software discipline to the point that the software experts 
are viewed as important as the structural or major systems experts.  Though this 
certainly is not a unique idea, the inference that linguistic discontinuity as we move 
across the spectrum of “equal partners” affects the process is a less researched and 
defined concept.  
The two tables on the following page represent a hypothetical situation that 
could occur as we define the requirements for IWMDT with the users, software 
engineers and programmers. Though this is only an example of a typical 
requirement process it presents the basic premise of lost meaning as words are 


















I want to be able 
to use a browser 
to run the 
application 
User has a requirement 
for a browser-like GUI. 
Requirement is to 
develop a user-friendly 
browser-like GUI while 
maintaining the current 
client-server architecture. 
I do not want to 
download or 
otherwise install 
any software on 
my computer 
 The user is forced to load 
over 2 GB of program data, 
and maps.  Network 
administrator denies the 
user the right to load the 
software on his local 
machine because it requires 
ports be opened, his local 
machine does not have 2GB 
of user available space.  
I need the ability 
to predict which 
way I should 
move my troops 
Provide a course of 
action tool that tells the 
decision maker where 
and when to move his/her 
troops to minimize 
exposure 
Don’t give me the 
answer, give me 
the information 
for me to make a 
decision 
If the tool is driving the 
movement of troops and 
equipment than the only 
consideration is the WME. 
This is not the way that we 
must operate on the 
battlefield. The WME is only 
one of many considerations 
for troop movement. 
Commander will not be 
hostage to any one tool. 
Table 1. Linguistic discontinuity – Software Engineer. 
User Stated 
Objective 
Programmer Hears Intended 
Meaning 
Potential Impact 
I want to be able 
to use a browser 
to run the 
application 
I need to redesign my 
entire architecture to 
take the current thick 
client architecture and 
develop thin client 
architecture. The 
requirement is to 
develop a system that 
performs all actions 
except display on a 
server in a remote 
location, and post to the 
local client  
I do not want to 
download or 
otherwise install 
any software on 
my computer 
Though the programmer is 
closer to the meaning of the 
user, this is not necessarily 
what the user requested. By 
using a thin client 
architecture the programmer 
is eliminating the 
requirement to load or install 
any software, but he is 
introducing the bandwidth 
problem. If the user does not 
have network access, this 
system is of no value.   
I need the ability 
to predict which 
way I should 
move my troops 
Develop a tool that can 
be user-selected to layer 
plume assessments and 
route impact. 
Don’t give me the 
answer, give me 
the information for 
me to make a 
decision 
The introduction of layers 
and user-selected 
assessments is a good 
method, but coupled with the 
route impact this becomes a 
very expensive venture. 
Potential for loss of focus 
and costly development is 
very high. 
Table 2. Linguistic discontinuity – Programmer. 
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This is a simple example of how easily the linguistic meaning is continuously 
challenged as we worked through the specific requirements for IWMDT and 
represents a typical community phenomenon. The simple manner that causes the 
lost of meaning illustrates Professor Riehle’s statements and coining of the phrase 
“linguistic discontinuity”.  But, the problem is more complicated than just the 
definition of a few words or even the concepts that users want to express. Assuming 
we work through the language differences and we define the specific users 
requirement we now have the larger issue of determining if the user understands 
their own linguistic bias.  
 Much of the poor requirement solicitation prevalent in the government 
process is due to the disparate requirements and the geographically unique 
environments.  The requirement solicitation is normally an indirect process because 
of the evolutionary nature of the requirement maturity. Even though all modern 
military units account for and train to fight within a WME environment, the methods 
and training frequency is largely based on each commander’s assessment. Each 
commander is responsible for their own unit’s readiness, and determination of the 
potential threat for operating within any particular environment.   
In the military we must consider the potential to operate within a contaminated 
environment every time we deploy. Just as true with other potential threats or 
impacts, commanders must plan their training and operational concepts to 
accommodate the effects of WME.  This planning is normally insufficient for the 
actual effects of WME assuming the units were faced with actual affected area.  A 
primary reason why the effect of WME is underestimated in training and planning is 
due to the low potential for occurrence. One of the roles of the military leader is to 
assess the potential for a given impairment and then train and plan to overcome the 
obstacle.  
  With a lower than average potential for occurrence commanders do not 
emphasize training that would unduly affect normal operating procedures, by training 
for the low potential WME environment.  This is not an indictment on the 
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commanders it is a statement of efficiency for limited training opportunities. If we 
accept the authors postulation that it is not limited vision that causes a lack of 
training than Higher Commands must confer a sense of urgency to the probability of 
WME in order to get it trained more frequently. 
 Assuming we are able to affect the frequency of the training, it now becomes 
even more critical that the data and information that results from the training be 
relevant. This data represents the entities and events that the commanders are 
already considering in other areas of the training and must be realistic to be 
believed. The accessibility and extensible of this data is a key in the integration of 
WME into other battlefield operations. 
  
C. DATA REQUIREMENTS 
Because DTRA is not an intelligence provider they rely heavily on other 
Agencies and systems to provide the key data required for IWMDT. This data is 
gathered through classified and unclassified means and is propagated across the 
world to support Major Commands and Key Allies. Because much of this data is 
available only within the Commands, effective application of IWMDT will rely on 
establishing processes that allow the IWMDT operator to gain access to this data. 
This data includes terrain, hard target graphics, agent information, weather data and 
any key information maintained by the Commands. In DoD a key overarching 
objective is to enable data suppliers to provide critical, timely, affordable, verified 
and validated data to the user community. Based on this objective the goal is by 
providing validated and verified data it will enable models and simulations use to 
gain credibility and to support more key decisions.  
To accomplish this, the data and information providers must understand the 
standard that they are expected to meet when they store and distribute the data to 
the users. These standards address data element definitions, data dictionaries, data 
models etc. There is not a universal standard; therefore software development 
agencies such as DTRA are not guided to a standard method when developing their 
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systems. It is imperative that developers make every attempt to adhere to 
commercial standards allowing them to benefit from the tremendous amount of data 
that is commonly produced outside of DoD. Hence, most software developers across 
DoD maintain a working knowledge of both the DoD policies as well as the 
commercial standards. 
The DoD Master Plan for Models and Simulations defines data as: 
specification of facts, parameters, values, concepts, or instructions in a formalized 
manner suitable for communications, interpretation, or processing by humans or by 
automatic means.  Closely related is “information”, which is defined as, data in 
context, related to a specific purpose.  In lieu of a universal DoD standard, DTRA 
developed interfaces with common commercial data standards that are in broad use 
across the domain community. The decision to use commercial standards enabled 
the developers to expand their design extensibility to provide for future integration 
efforts. These standards are required to provide accurate representation of sea, air 
and land entities both internally as well as in external integration of other 
applications with IWMDT. 
IWMDT is designed to allow the accurate prediction of hazard assessments 
across blue water, brown water and land, and to include three-dimensional objects. 
The data requirement for IWMDT requires authoritative representation of the 
permanent and semi-permanent man-made features as well as the natural terrain. 
The data must allow IWMDT to process model data for generating, moving, 
dispersing, and dissipating atmospheric phenomena.  
1.      Specific Data Standards 
The IWMDT data storage and retrieval system is based on existing databases 
developed under a separate program entitled Integrated Target Planning Tool Set 
(ITPTS). This database structure supports a consolidated targeting system, using a 
tree-node database tree structure. The use of a tree structure provides separate root 
nodes for public folders and personal folders. Following the Windows method of 
management, some nodes contain no specific files but exist for logical groupings.   
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Though the database module does not benefit from the organization the 
database navigator does.  Having designed it based on Windows structure methods: 
the structure is viewable as a hard drive directory with the root node appearing as a 
drive letter like other drive directories.   
The database is organized in a hierarchy of nodes (rather than tables), which 
introduces the following characteristics:  the primary nodes are designed in parent-
child relationships, which reference other nodes by key linking. Within the nodes the 
databases contain node types (target, session, etc.), properties (string/value pair 
metadata about the node), comments (system and user-generated information), 
approvals (contents has been examined by an approving authority), and files 
(analysis data, multiple files per node, BLOB-format).  The use of the node hierarchy 
provides us at least two key advantages, we retain analysis data in a common 
location (useful for centralized backup and replication), and we retain the 
classification pedigree for the data (useful for handling multi-level security of data 
and providing centralized access-control and managing “need to know”).  
The IWMDT server communicates with the database through a CORBA 
interface, running under a JBOSS application environment.  As a JBOSS service it 
exposes its factory classes and naming context to other services across the network. 
Components across the IWMDT toolset have access to the information using the 
“NodeEntity” bean, which uses CORBA to interact with the persistent storage.  
The database structure provides the ability to organize and retain the 
relationships between analysis projects, provide separate domains for users, groups 
(future), public analysis projects, and provide declarative security (future).  The 
database also allows projects to be stored in their native format without dictating 
rules or data types. Through the use of meta-data the database is capable of 
allowing projects to be queried, and to interrogate other applications without 
understanding the native format.  
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2.       Data Composibility 
Even when all stated standards are adhered to, all data must be re-validated 
when introduced to new applications. As a premier Chemical, Biological and Nuclear 
Agency within DoD, DTRA has invested large amounts of money and time in the 
development and credibility of the source term data. IWMDT has ensured that this 
research and credibility has transferred into their tool by maintaining the same 
source definitions and data from previous bodies of work. This work has been 
validated in the field, laboratory and through many series of analysis and 
comparison in HPAC.  
But in spite of the largess of DTRA to provide this data to other users and 
models, the data must be validated and verified each time it is applied to new 
applications. Because the data is not isomorphic, it is unable to aptly evolve to meet 
nuances that are introduced when we apply different criteria in various models. So, 
when IWMDT matures past the R&D project into a deployable application, the data 
will require recertification as if it were a new source of data. Of course the previous 
validity is of value and is not discarded, but the application of the data in this 
particular development environment will be tested.  
Specific data that needs certified includes not only the standard weaponized 
agents but also all of the Industrial Toxic Chemicals (TIC). The TICs are not typically 
as dangerous as the other agents but with extended access they can be lethal. 
There are over fifty TICs included in the standard library and just as is the case with 
the chemical and biological agents, more can be added by creating material files. 
The creation of material files is not a novice chore and should not be done without 
expert supervision to ensure that the complete agent property value is correctly 
captured. 
 
D. WEATHER REQUIREMENTS 
Source and agent data is an important aspect of predicting WME hazards, but 
without a reliable wind model the agents are not properly transported or dispersed. 
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Within IWMDT the reliance on weather is an integral part of the all assessments. 
Three different instantiations of weather are applied depending on the separate 
requirements.  The three types for weather forecasts are: historical weather 
(climatology), forecast weather (numerical weather predictions), and current weather 
(observations).  
Time permitting the user should apply all three of these weather data sources 
to their solution as shown in Figure 8 on the following page. Each source is applied 
at a different stage in the model use. As shown on the next page, a suggested 
timeline process is applied to the final development of the prediction.  The figure 
illustrates the applicability of weather sources depending on the time to execution. 
For planning purposes or to anticipate events within a five-day period, forecast 
weather is the optimal source. For a post-event or real-time response, the user 
should apply current observations.  
The use of multi-layered time sequenced weather is a unique element of 
IWMDT (drawn in from HPAC) because hazard prediction and the weather 
correspond with the estimate of confidence. The weather model bases this 
confidence on estimates of the uncertainty inherent in the forecast weather data. 
The estimates are calculated using real time probabilistic methods (for example, 
ensembling techniques) or via empirical models embedded within the software. This 
is a unique element of HPAC model (as well as IWMDT which incorporates HPAC) 
because hazard prediction and the weather correspond with the estimate of 
confidence. HPAC and IWMDT base confidences on estimates of the uncertainty 
inherent in the forecast weather data. These estimates are calculated using real time 
probabilistic methods (for example, ensembling techniques) or via empirical models 













































































There are five major providers of the weather data that IWMDT utilizes for 
assessments. These are:  
1. Navy Operational Global Atmospheric Prediction System (NOGAPS) – 
Global coverage, 80-kilometer resolution 
2.  Navy model, Coupled Ocean/Atmosphere Mesoscale Prediction 
System (COAMPS) – Covers most areas of interest, 9-27-kilometer 
resolution, Navy model 
3.  Mesoscale Model Version 5 (MM5) – Covers most areas of interest, 5-
45-kilometer resolution, Air Force model 
4.  Regional Atmospheric Modeling System (RAMS) - Covers small areas 
of interest, 1-10 km resolution 
5. Operational Multi-scale Environment Model with Grid Adaptivity 
(OMEGA) – Covers small areas of interest, 1-10 km resolution. DTRA 
meteorologists generate RAMS or OMEGA products upon special 
request by users. 
 
E. MAPPING REQUIREMENTS 
The previous sections discussed the importance of the agent data and 
weather data, even with this well defined and populated, if we cannot present the 
information in a consistent and user-friendly manner the value is lost. One of the key 
goals of IWMDT was to develop the application around a central mapping system. 
The choice of standards was to use ARCGIS from ESRI. According to the ESRI 
ArcGIS website, ARCGIS is “a scalable system of software for geographic data for 
every organization-from an individual to a globally distributed network of people”.  
This common map interface must be functional for targeting, which involves scaling 




In a recently released document outlining the framework for IWMDT, the 
following map requirements were elicited as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Maintained Map GUI Features (From IWMDT CM Plan.) 
Provide ability to add (V0.5)/move /edit  
/remove  IWMDT features like incidents 
on map 
Provide ability to Pan, Scroll, Zoom in, Zoom out, and 
Zoom to full extent, Zoom to layer, Zoom to scale, 
Center on point, Zoom previous, and Refresh map 
(V0.5)  
Display CADRG/CIB and other 3rd party 
standard GIS formats on map (V0.5) 
Provide ability to set display options for IWMDT 
features like symbol size and symbol types  
Provide ability to display a map (V0.5) Provide ability to export map and legend images to 
user’s computer (V0.5) 
Provide ability to hide and show layers on 
map (V0.5) 
Provide ability to add/remove/reorder layers on map 
(V0.5)  
Use 0.5 mapping services with minimum 
porting to ESRI 9/CJMTK 
Manage new mapping requirements to support new 
subsystems GIS capabilities 
Provide ability to add points (V0.5), lines, 
polygon, shapefiles (V0.5), and raster   
data as layer on map 
Provide ability to set transparency for each mapping 
service (V0.5) 
Provide ability to export layers as ArcIMS 
Image (V0.5) and Feature services 
Provide ability to hide and show each mapping 
service (V0.5) 
Provide ability to display multiple mapping 
services at a time (V0.5) 
Provide mapping capabilities as a web service (V0.5) 
Provide ability to add/remove/reorder 
links to mapping services (V0.5) 




































IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARCHITECTURE 
A. REQUIREMENTS BASED PROTOTYPING 
Typically in requirements engineering, prototyping is used to involve the user 
in the development process in an iterative process. By developing a user interface 
the process allows users to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed system early 
in the development process making it is easier to modify the design.  Correctly 
applied evolutionary prototyping should gather a correct and consistent set of 
requirements. The process tends to strengthen the design process by clarifying the 
stated requirements and identifying the approach to meeting those requirements. 
But, a drawback to this approach is the requirement creep that typically occurs when 
gathering requirements and other requirements are spawned.   
One of the ways to counter-balance the impact of this dilemma is through the 
use of domain analysis. For the IWMDT effort, much of this was simplified by the fact 
that the author was the architect, user and decision-maker.  As discussed earlier in 
the thesis, the author had two complementary roles, one role was to go forward to 
Commands and use the tools that he developed under the first role of COTR.  
Not considering a unique situation as we had in IWMDT, the domain analysis 
is essential in designing high-quality software tools. The intent of domain analysis is 
to help the development team understand the requirements, identify the fundamental 
abstractions, verify the design and direct the implementation. Implementation of this 
task requires issues such as linguistic discontinuity to be minimized through 
recognition and active response.  
In an ironic twist of literary application, it is humorous to note that even the 
term “domain” is not consistently defined within the software community. As we 
attempt to clarify terms, it is ironic that even the concept we are employing can be 
ambiguous.  Depending on the view we are considering, the term morphs into 
various derivatives of the same concept. The key is to recognize whose view we are 
considering. From a user-based view, the term domain analysis refers to 
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understanding the background of the end-user. Typically a clear way to articulate 
this is through use cases. The use case allows the actors, events and responses to 
be graphically portrayed, with their relationships demonstrated. From the perspective 
of the domain engineering community, domain analysis refers to studying the 
background knowledge necessary to solve the software design problem. And yet in 
a third perspective the term may refer to the evaluation of available 
hardware/software technology. Just as pointed out in other areas of the thesis, 
clarity of terms and requirements is critically important in the process of 
development.  
Just as we need a short context explanation to agree on the definition of the 
term “domain”, we also need to understand the context for the term “architecture”. In 
1969, Fred Brooks and Ken Iverson9 described the term as "conceptual structure of 
a computer...as seen by the programmer". Less than two years later Brooks offered 
a more defined definition for architecture as, "the complete and detailed specification 
of the user interface. For a computer, this is the programming manual, for a 
compiler, it is the language manual... for the entire system it is the union of the 
manuals the user must consult to do his entire job." A contemporary of this 
gentleman, Gene Blaauw10 offered a clear distinction between architecture and 
implementation. Quoting Blaauw, Brooks writes, "Where architecture tells what 
happens, implementation tells how it is made to happen." Because of the object-
oriented nature of IWMDT this is a very important distinction. Because the evolution 
of the IWMDT capability remains focused on architecture, it is obviously important to 
ensure we understand the architecture.  
The design view consists of three primary capability-based functional areas. 
The three areas are consequence assessment (CA), targeting support (TS) and 
nuclear phenomenology.  Each of these areas is based on stand-alone capabilities 
that has been thoroughly tested and VVA for use worldwide. The architecture areas 
                                            
9  http://www.sei.cmu.edu/architecture/roots.html, May 2004 
10  http://www.research.ibm.com/journal/rd/441/amdahl.pdf, May 2004 
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are demonstrated in the diagram on the next page. The CA area migrated much of 
the HPAC capabilities, the TS migrated much of the IMEA capabilities, and the 
nuclear area migrated Integrated Nuclear Capability Assessment (INCA) and nuclear 
modules out of HPAC. Though the challenge of addressing the need for a WME 
assessment tool on-site was first addressed in 1991 after the Gulf War11, IWMDT 
addresses the new innovative needs for providing shared databases and reducing 
the technology burden. The new implementation has only two user requirements: 
user must have network access, and second, user must have a standard windows 
compatible browser.  This is simple, direct and easily understood, but bearing in 
mind our linguistic discontinuity is it really this simple?  
The requirement is simply stated and yet broad enough to allow the engineers 
to perform software engineering magic. The magic is taking stand-alone tools each 
written against different requirements, with different definitions of common terms, 
without a common mapping protocol and integrating the tools into a common web-
services based tool. This tool is expected to meet current capabilities of each stand-
alone tool within a common mapping framework and a common GUI.  
These requirements alone make this a daunting task, but consider that the 
project requirements are mostly pre-determined by the existing capabilities of the 
stand-alone tools integrated in the tool, and this becomes a real challenge. The key 
in this project must be less focused on previous validated user requirements, which 
are largely pre-determined for IWMDT, and more on the engineering approach to 
integrate the tools and provide a common front end.  
Presented in Figure 9 is the IWMDT design architecture. Following the figure 
is the design methodology, which is presented as a short description of the three 
major functional area tools. The description of HPAC is more detailed as the HPAC 
architecture and program stream was the baseline methodology used in IWMDT. 
                                            
11 Toth, J.A. (1999).  Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) 
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Figure 9.   IWMDT Model Integration Diagram. 
 (From IWMDT How To Manual, 2003.) 
 
B. HPAC ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT 
To this point in the thesis, we have spoken of the post Gulf War technologies 
and looked at the requirements for new tools and transformation of existing tools. 
We then looked at some of the shortcomings of the current system as defined by the 
author’s experiences. After deploying on operational support mission representing 
DTRA for over two years, it is obvious to the author that in spite of having quality 
tools, the inability to locally host or remotely access this data was an impediment to 
DTRA success. This architecture was designed to consist of three areas of interest.  
We now look at the architectural methods and concepts that define the tools that 
were integrated into the IWMDT architecture.  
 The first tool we will look at is the HPAC tool. It is important to understand the 
design of HPAC because many of the methods and processes are common in 
IWMDT and HPAC. The original architect stated three guiding goals for the 
architecture, portability, extensibility and flexibility.  The descriptions below describe 
the intent of the goals and the process of adherence.  
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1. Portability 
The myriad of requirements from a rapidly growing number of users in the 
1990s presented the early engineers with daunting challenges for portability. One of 
the immature attempts included attempting to use a cross platform development 
environment, MainWin from MainSoft12, to build a UNIX version.  Due to the required 
time to accomplish this effort the attempt was abandoned.  Developers soon lagged 
behind the Windows implementation and achieved incongruent results from the 
differences in FORTRAN compilers and the way dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were 
handled. The engineers also concluded that the resulting application was an 
unpleasant UNIX user experience due to significant behavioral differences.  A follow-
on effort to port only the calculation engine to UNIX was more successful but also 
was abandoned due to performance lag in spite of the increased calculation ability 
on UNIX hardware13.  Using emulation environments allowed execution of the client 
Win32 application under Unix Operating System, and eliminated the expected 
performance degradation of calculations under an emulated environment.  
 
2. Extensibility 
Design documents in 1991 identified the requirement to allow new plug-in 
source models without requiring system rebuilds. A core module of HPAC is the 
Second-order Closure Integrated Puff (SCIPUFF), a Lagrangian puff dispersion 
model developed by Titan System Corporation14. This module requires detailed data 
of meteorology, terrain, material files as well as other inputs be fed to SCIPUFF to 
calculate the transport and dispersion. From this calculation the user is provided 
tracks, material concentrations, depositions, and doses. As new source models are 
improved they are added to the model to allow improved analysis, without an 
extensible architecture, this would not be possible with code rebuilds.  
                                            
12 http://www.mainsoft.com/products/pdfs/datasheet.pdf 
13 http://wigner.cped.ornl.gov/HPAC/info/paper.tm.pdf 




Original documents indicate that HPAC system requirements elicited three 
basic modes of deployment; a standalone system with no network connection, a 
client-server arrangement with data available on the client but calculations 
performed on a server (heavy client), and a client-server environment with data 
downloaded to the client from the server and calculations performed on the server 
(thin client). All three of these methods are viable deployment options for IWMDT, 
though much of the web-services methodology is lost on all but the last method.  An 
enabler for allowing HPAC to demonstrate the three goals mentioned here is the use 
of CORBA services as shown below. This architecture discussed later in the chapter 











Figure 10.   HPAC Architecture Activities (From Pgm Plan, 2003.) 
 
C. HPAC-WARFIGHTER ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT 
In 2002, the next significant architecture generation leading to IWMDT was 
introduced. The 2002 development of HPAC-Warfighter15 was introduced as the first 
web-browser based HPAC tool Figure 11. In collaboration with key SAIC developers, 
the author developed the architecture and operational vision for allowing web-based 
access to HPAC functionality. The author’s vision was based on his previous                                             
15 Developed as an intermediate process under the Battlefield Casualty Federate (BCF) 
effort. SAIC developed under BCF program at request of Major Ric Jones, COTR 
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experiences of deploying forward and being unable to load the required software on 
a locally controlled network. An issue that lead-up exercise to the Feb 2003 
deployment to Iraqi Freedom identified as a requirement for forward deployed 
individuals.  
As the senior WME hazard assessment analyst in the combat theater the 
author used the distributed HPAC-Warfighter tool in Iraqi Freedom 2003. The 
architecture did not meet the author’s needs completely but the tool served as a very 
useful precursor to the development of IWMDT requirements and expectations.  
Understanding the security implications of accessing networks and the 
sensitivity toward loading software on local workstations, the author’s design 
document and requirement statement was specifically focused on web-services. The 
focus was the elimination of local load requirements, replaced with shared, 
accessible, visible data and processes. The early effort was far more focused and 
limited in the application of web services than the eventual development of IWMDT, 
but served as a vital impetus to the program. This was the most prominent of the 
follow-on efforts but shared development between a series of efforts made this 
possible.  
 The HPAC-Warfighter effort contributed to a significant follow-on effort 
entitled Battlefield Casualty Federate (BCF). Based on the incredible innovation and 
ingenuity of key software engineers and managers from Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC)16, and the author’s vision, DTRA was able to 
continue to expand the tool in manner that later would serve IWMDT members. 
HPAC-J introduced minor but significant changes to the HPAC tool. The changes 
provided a simple “unit” GUI button and associated ability to publish and subscribe 
unit information. The associated algorithms and logic to populate the data tables was 
previously incorporated in the code as a method for engineers to validate the code 
functionality but not associated with a GUI button.  
 
                                            
16 Continued HPAC-J effort - Mike Chagnon, Dave Walters, Mark Quan - SAIC 
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This effort bridged the technology from HPAC-J to the current IWMDT effort. 
The yellow button shown below in Figure 11 demonstrates the improved HPAC-J 
GUI functionality.   This change allowed users to place units in their areas of concern 
and receive a tabulated or visual result of contamination. When linked to an active 
common operating picture (COP) this tool was capable of doing real-time unit 
specific plot assessments.  
The results from these efforts were validated during Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) 
02, United States Forces Korea (USFK) in a collaborative effort with the Defense 
Modeling Simulation Office (DMSO)17, but due to local network constraints further 









Figure 11.   HPAC-J GUI ([From Prgm Review – SAIC, 2003].) 
 
The knowledge gained during these tests directly contributed to the current 
IWMDT effort. With the units location precisely determined the predicted effect of 
units or specific areas is more qualitative. The intent for this module enhancement 
was to allow users to receive GCCS tracks and automatically update icons and 
perform assessments of hazardous exposures.  But without a direct feed from a 
GCCS-K system, the user must hand place or manually enter data for the units or 
sensors prior to assessing the hazardous exposure predictions.  
                                            
17  Collaborative DMSO/(MITRE) – DTRA effort 2002, USFK was test site UFL2002 
 47
Though this change had great utility and was implemented, the eventual goal 
of accessible, shared data was not yet achieved. With a taste for collaboration now, 
the author continued to push the envelope with the excellent SAIC development 
team. As the author’s learning of software engineering and methods accelerated in 
the distant learning program at NPS, his ability to ask the right questions improved. 
The improvement in his questions coupled with the understanding of the 
development team needs led to the refinement of IWMDT requirements. 
 
D. IMEA ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT 
Just as the CBRNE community had requirements for the hazard prediction 
tool addressed by HPAC, the targeting community has requirements for predicting 
and controlling collateral effects and prompt response addressed by IMEA. Under 
the Counterproliferation (CP) ACTD, the principle sponsor U.S. European Command 
(USEUCOM) with support from U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), tasked 
DTRA as Executive Agent to develop, integrate, demonstrate, and transition a 
suitable tool to the warfighters.  
As the Executive Agent, DTRA contracted Applied Research Associates 
(ARA)18 as the prime application developers. Other development organizations 
involved selected Department of Energy Laboratories, the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency and the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office.  
Based on demonstrated success on related projects, ARA chose the spiral 
development method for developing the Munitions Effectiveness Assessment (MEA) 
tool. The diagram below illustrates the five critical elements considered in the spiral 
development process. The first element is Requirements; this step is the basis for 
the other steps and relies on an accurate definition of the user requirements.  The 
next step is Analysis; the effective translation by the engineer of the requirements 
into a top-level design is a key here. A successful translation of the requirements 
enables a robust development of component level designs. To this point the 
                                            
18  http://www.ara.com/ May, 2004 
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engineer has developed the logic and requirement based templates, now the 
engineer must develop the code that supports the previous work. This stage is the 
Implementation stage. As the code is developed, the last step, Testing, is 
introduced. This is an iterative process testing at all levels of the program from unit 
through integration and eventually system level testing. 
 
Figure 12.   Spiral Development Process (ARA PGM Plan, 2003.) 
 
In 1996, Phase I of the ACTD directed DTRA to employ current or very-near-
term technology products in weapons, sensors, target planning, and collateral 
effects minimization. Additionally they were tasked to operationally demonstrate the 
capabilities against simulated biological agents housed in a soft, aboveground 
structure. The development provided significant engineering model and visualization 
capabilities for building/bunkers and tunnel modules. 
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As shown below the initial testing scenario evaluated the ability of the 
software tool to provide timely and accurate target planning support. The diagram 
below represents a typical attack scenario attacking a cut & cover bunker and a 
semi-hardened building.  
 
 
Figure 13.   ACTD CONOPS for Phase I. 
 
The demonstration was successfully completed and the enhanced models 
improved the accuracy and fidelity of the existing damage prediction algorithms. The 
testing also allowed extension of the current capability including additional weapon 
effects, weapon types, and damage mechanisms. Shortly after the Phase I testing, 
Phase II requirements were refined and schedules were established for 
enhancement of the software to meet additional challenging needs.  
Phase II included sensors and data fusion for target planning and Battle 
Damage Assessment (BDA). Specifically the requirement addressed methodologies 
to assess weapon effectiveness for determining structural and functional 
damage/kills and agent dispersal/collateral effects.  Additionally meteorological 
effects, enhancements in adverse weather weapon delivery, improved weapon 
penetration, warhead lethality, and fuzing was addressed. Figure 14 illustrates the 
notional concept of operations for Phase II.  
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Figure 14.   ACTD CONOPS for Phase II. 
 
After the CP II ACTD was completed, DTRA continued to enhance the tool 
and in 2000 MEA was integrated with HPAC to become Integrated Munitions 
Effectiveness Assessment tool (IMEA). This integrated capability was carried 
forward to the IWMDT development effort. 
 
E. IWMDT ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT 
Now with an understanding of the primary models that IWMDT consists of, we 
will look specifically at the IWMDT Architecture. The proposed design consists of 
four tiers. One of the primary formal goals of the effort according to DTRA 
documents is, “to make shared components available as platform independent 
components so that clients can connect to them through a standard interface.”19  
The informal architecture goals are to eliminate all local plug-in download 
requirements, eliminate any third-party costs to the user, implement web-services, 
and provide a common map-based environment for WME assessment.  
                                            
19  M&S Master Plan 2003 - DTRA 
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One of the early design decisions for the architecture was the choice to use 
CORBA20 as the distributed object architecture. Other architectures were considered 
and eliminated for various reasons. DCOM was rejected because it is not generally 
platform independent, being primarily Windows operating system friendly.  Java 
RMI21 was rejected because it requires java code on client and server side, and a 
goal was not to require any code on the client side. The use of EJB was rejected due 
to the high server side resources, though it does scale well it was envisioned as 
being too high end for this application. EJB may be incorporated or employed in the 
future depending on the growth of the toolset. The use of CORBA is generally 
thought to be a vendor, platform, and language neutral choice and is consistent with 
the intent of this program.  Web-services will certainly invalidate much of the CORBA 
activity in the near future but as of the development of this architecture, CORBA was 
still the better choice.  
Based on a tiered approach the architecture for IWMDT invites a myriad of 
challenges. At each level of the architecture the integration and interoperability is 
exasperated by the dissimilar code structures of the component modules.  Each 
component was designed and developed as a stand-alone tool, and each is a very 
complex and interdependent set of routines.  Though the tools were developed as 
stand-alone applications, the interdependencies are well documented which does 
enable accurate interface documentation. 
The IWMDT architecture has four tiers; Client, Web, Business, and Enterprise 
Information Systems (EIS) as shown in Figure 15. The Client Tier consists primarily 
of HTML and is the data presentation level. The Web Tier is primarily JSP pages 
and servlets designed to process the get and post requests.  The Business Tier 
handles the core logic and interfaces with the data sources and various engineering 
models. The final tier, EIS performs the data storage and retrieval services from the 
calculation engines within the engineering models. In addition to the use of tiers as 
                                            
20 The Common Object Request Broker: Architecture and Specification, Revision 2.3.1, Object 
Management Group, Inc., October 1999. 
21 Java™ RMI Over IIOP, http://java.sun.com/products/rmi-iiop/index.html. 
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Figure 15.   IWMDT Prototype Architecture. 
(From IWMDT Pgm Plan, 2003.) 
 
1. Client Tier  
The Client Tier provides the network API for applications, which allows 
applications to be written in a variety of languages. Within this tier numerous 
capabilities are addressed to include providing a consistent data standard, providing 
access for clients, providing directory services for toolbox components and providing 
a common look/feel.  
2. Web Tier 
Applications should keep data, control, and presentation logic as separate 
entities.  The Model-View-Control pattern22, is an example of this. shown in Figure 
16.  In the MVC pattern, a web server receives a GET or POST from the browser. 
The request is packaged and sent to a controller servlet that performs an action 
against the data and generates the result, which is rendered into HTML by a JSP 
viewer. 
 
                                            

















Figure 16.   Model-View-Controller pattern. 
(From IWMDT Dev TIM, 2003.) 
 
 
3. Business Tier 
Under the Business Tier there are two distinct component types, system 
components and low-level components. The system components are responsible for 
integrating low level components, providing high level interface for use by 
applications, implementing Web Service and CORBA interfaces, and causing the 
application to be extensible for other types of interfaces (Jini or RMI etc). Examples 
of direct implications of the capabilities provided in this tier are IHPAC and Weather 
services.  
The second type of component that is employed is the low-level component 
type. The components within this level have a single focused responsibility. This 
focused approach allows each component to contain a primary algorithm for 
calculating responsibility. These types are primarily for internal IWMDT used by 
systems components, they provide a CORBA interface and if required enable an 





4. EIS Tier (Subtier- Legacy Tier) 
The next tier level is the EIS Tier consisting of tow sub-tiers. The first sub-tier 
is the Legacy Tier, which provides an application framework. This tier is responsible 
for providing a toolbox of GUI components as well as allowing rapid application 
development by supplying commonly used GUI components. Through this level we 
are provided with a set of interface data translators that allows for a common data 
communication mechanism. This level also provides an interface for data translators 
allowing data to be shared among components when their native data standards 
aren’t compatible. Due to the open nature of the development design applications 
can have a GUI (browser or heavy client GIS) or be batch/script-based. Examples of 
this level are HPAC, CATS, IMEA, and WALTS  
5. EIS Tier (Subtier - Utility Tier) 
The second sub-tier is the Utility Tier, which allows distribution of data, and 
allows multiple users or servers to access data simultaneously. The data resides in 
this tier that contains the data used and generated by the Toolbox. This data 
normally physical resides in an external database such as Oracle or SQL Server or it 
may reside in flat files. An important aspect of the data storage is that it can reside at 
disparate locations, can be accessed via the Web or LAN, and it allows for new 
types of data to easily be integrated into the Toolbox. Examples of this level are: 
Weather, Deposition/Dosage, Population, and Terrain. 
 
F. GRAPHICAL USER INTERFACE (GUI) 
The tiers provide internal functionality, but the functionality of the interface is 
equally important. The graphical user interface (GUI) is very important to users, and 
may decide if they are willing to use the tool. The map format is ARC-GIS based on 
ESRI products loaded on the server side that do not require local download or plug-
ins for the client. The main IWMDT interface is a simple map-based interface 
allowing layer tailoring on parallel frames while maintaining the map display in the 









Figure 17.   IWMDT Prototype GUI. 
(From IWMDT Design Plan, 2003) 
 
Though there is not a consistent preference for all users, for the sake of 
screen efficiency and based on expert opinion the best way to provide the 
information and allow tailored appearance was the use of frames. The effectiveness 
of GUIs for applications using Web-services is an area of research that continues to 
receive a great of attention across our field.23 
Within the left frame is a set of boxes that is easily selected to tailor the map 
display for each user’s requirements based on the availability of information at that 
level. As we change scale of the map, alternative scales are offered. The scales 
currently span from 1m data up to standard 1:250K map displays. The architecture 
allows users to reference imagery, maps or feature data. When performing analysis 
and plotting predicted contours it is very important to maintain geographic context. A 
prediction of 30KM in a northwest direction obviously is more relevant if we are 
plotting over Baghdad than if we are outside Bayji in central Iraq.  In Figure 18 we 
see a number of other positive user-friendly features of this GUI.  
The Main Window Layout consists of classification panes at top and bottom of 
window, application header pane below top classification pane, and the main 
application pane and status pane.  The Sub-dialog Layout consists of classification 
                                            
23  V. Maciejewski and J. Zukowski, .Developing Rich User Interfaces for Software 
Services., Spidertop Technical Report TR101, Spidertop, Inc., October 2001. 
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panes at top and bottom of window, and navigation (summary) pane and working 
(detail) pane. The layers shown on the right side allow the user to easily identify the 
contours and isolate layers as desired (not shown). The “map-quest” appearance of 
the GUI allows an easily understood method of scaling and manipulation. Most users 
are familiar with the magnifying glass to expand or reduce the area of the map which 
is used in this design.  
 







G. ANALYSIS OF DESIGN DIAGRAMS   
The current development effort is based on client-server implementation of 
supporting computational tools allowing access to the capabilities of separate tools 
in an integrated toolset using web services. At the conceptual level there are defined 
frameworks described by LISI24 which distinguish the following layers: Isolated 
Systems (No physical connection exists), Connected Systems (Homogeneous 
product exchange is possible), Distributed Systems (Heterogeneous product 
exchange is possible), Integrated Systems (Shared applications and shared data), 
and Universal systems (Enterprise wide shared systems). The IWMDT design is 
similar to previous internal code design with a new web services GUI. The new GUI 
and the enterprise wide openness certainly provide justification to indicate that the 
system type is approaching “universal system”. This implies that we have enterprise 
wide sharing of data and processes. As shown in this document, it is certainly the 
goal of the IWMDT to accomplish this functionality. The task is not completed yet, 
but with continued excellence they are rapidly approaching the goal.  In Figure 19 
we see the top-level breadth of the IWMDT capability goals. 
 
Figure 19.   Integration of DTRA Tools into the GIG (IWMDT SDR) 
                                            
24  http://www.DoDccrp.org/events/1999/1999CCRTS/pdf_files/track_5/049clark.pdf 
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During a recent Simulation International Standards Organization (SISO) panel 
discussion on priorities for M&S standards 25, Dr. Zeigler stated explicitly in his 
presentation, “…interoperability between systems standardization must be aimed at 
the modeling level, i.e., the standardized level must be higher than the programming 
level standards applied.” This is a wise statement and indicates that for DTRA to 
succeed they must emphasize the coordination of the underlying conceptual models 
and harmonize the resulting operational ideas. Special interest should be taken to 
focus solely on standardizing the information exchange requirements but also to look 
at the modeled cause-effect-chains, which must be coordinated. 
The intent for the IWMDT is to achieve the Universal System level of 
integration, with enterprise wide shared hazard information.  The current design 
provides the user a common GUI that interfaces with HPAC, IMEA and INCA 
(nuclear tool) with a common mapping background. If this is achieved than the 
recent success shown in Figure 20 of response times can be expected to drop 
further while the resolution of the results will increase. And, more importantly the 
integrated collaborative nature of IWMDT will provide much more accessible data 










of Targets  




>12 hours < 1 hour <30 minutes 
Oil Fire Impact >30 days <6 hours <1 hour 
Figure 20.   Hazard Prediction-IWMDT Approximations. 
 
                                            
25  In Conference at 2003 Fall SISO meeting, Orlando Florida  
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1. IWMDT-TS Diagrams 
The following diagrams demonstrate the engineering effort to integrate 
Targeting Support (TS) functions with the Consequence Assessment (CA) functions 
internal to the IWMDT tool. The diagrams are from the perspective of a user using 
IWMDT, and accessing the TS modules with a requirement to pass data to the CA 
modules for transport and dispersion. The TS software installer verifies the presence 
of CA on initial load and establishes the relationships through path assignments and 
specified interface calls. Figure 21 is a standard operation involving a user who 
chooses to evaluate a building, bunker or tunnel through the use of IWMDT-TS 
modules. This software allows the user to interactively design the target and 
iteratively develop weapon-target solutions. Figure 22 and 23 are sequence 
diagrams for the transport and dispersion of agents generated through the attack 



























Figure 22.   Sequence Diagram for SCIPUFF 
(From IWMDT Pgm Plan, 2003.) 
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Sequence Diagram Activities as demonstrated above: 
1. The IWMDT client connects to ICE to load the project file. 
2. ICE creates a reference to the IProject interface. 
3. IProject loads the requested project and returns a reference to the project 
interface. 
4. The client requests a reference to the IWeather interface.  
5. IProject creates an instance of IWeather. 
6. IWeather is a response of the form. 
7. The client populates the weather fields and sends them to the IWeather 
interface. 
8. IWeather returns a weather file.  
9. The client saves the weather to the project. 
10. The client requests a reference to IDispersionServer. 
11. IProject creates the server. 
12. IDispersionServer returns a reference. 
13. The client initiates an asynchronous Scipuff calculation. During the 
calculation, the client polls Scipuff for the calculation status and updates a 
progress bar. If an error occurs during the calculation, the client displays the 
error message and returns control to IWMDT.  






























Figure 23.   Generating a Plot . 







Sequence Diagram Activities as demonstrated above: 
1. The IWMDT client requests the IPlotMgr from the IProject interface. 
2. IProject creates an instance of IPlotMgr. 
3. IPlotMgr returns a reference. 
4. The client requests a reference to IPlot through IPlotMgr. 
5. IPlotMgr creates an instance of IPlot. 
6. IPlot returns a reference. 
7. The client sets the plot options according to the options set by the user in the 
Plot Options dialog. 
8. The client calls IPlot::compute to generate the plot. 
9. The client calls IPlot::export to export the plot to a shape file.  














V. IWMDT PRODUCT MANAGEMENT 
A. IWMDT CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT  
The bane of most programmers is the requirement to maintain consistent and 
thorough documentation. In most cases it is not true to say that they consider the 
documents to be a waste of time, developers thrive on well-documented 
requirements. It is only to say that it is a nuisance to the creative flow to maintain 
blasé descriptions of their excellence. Couple this predilection for focusing on the 
code with the aggressive scheduling that most government leads establish for the 
programs, we often find that documentation is neglected.  
As is true with most prototyping efforts, IWMDT aggressively developed a 
prototype first and is now establishing the structure of management. For IWMDT the 
existing management frameworks in place for the stand-alone integrated tools 
dictate much of the structure. The politics of funding and priorities for this project are 
incestuously linked with the previous programs. There are no less than four separate 
program managers that affect the development of IWMDT. Each of these program 
managers is responsible for continuing the stand-alone development while ensuring 
that they do not impinge on the success of IWMDT. To accomplish this task a 
number of efforts are emplaced to assist the program managers as well as the 
developers to maintain a consistent and integrated view. The first is the use of 
formal configuration management. 
1. Configuration Management Definition  
Configuration Management is often spoke about in the Government but rarely 
implemented with vitality. The primary reason why most government Contract Officer 
Representatives (COTR)26 diminish the utility of CM is their misunderstanding of the 
process.  
 
                                            
26  http://arc.publicdebt.treas.gov/DWP/fs/fsrgprct.htm ,Jun 2004 
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The CM process is intended to address seven primary areas according to 
Carnegie Mellon, Software Institute, a leader in software configuration management. 
The areas are:   
• Identification: identifying components, structure 
• Control: controlling releases and changes 
• Status accounting: recording, reporting status 
• Audit and review: validating completeness 
• Manufacture: managing construction, building 
• Process modeling: ensuring life-cycle model 
• Team work: controlling team interactions 
 
 Carnegie Mellon University as well as all other professionals in the field imply 
that these principles work when the process is routinely applied and institutionalized 
into the corporate process.  Consistent with this intent is DTRA’s adherence to 
IEEE/12207.  According to the IEEE 12207 definition shown below the adoption of 
this standard is different in content but consistent in intent with commercial 
definitions as expressed by Carnegie Mellon.   
The IEEE/12207.2 definition is: identify and define software items in systems, 
record and report the status of the items and modification requests, ensure the 
releases of the items, ensure the completeness consistency, and correctness of the 
items, control storage, handling, and delivery of the items. 
There are other consistent perspectives that illustrate the consistency of 




Software Configuration Management involves identifying the 
configuration of the software (i.e., selected software works products 
and their descriptions) at given points in time, systematically controlling 
changes to the configuration, and maintaining the integrity and 
traceability of the configuration throughout the software lifecycle. The 
work products placed under software configuration management 
include the software products that are delivered to the customer (e.g., 
the software requirements document and the code) and the items that 
are identified with or required to create these software products (e.g., 
the compiler). The SEI Software Capability Maturity Model (version 1.1)  
The key role of Software Configuration Management (SCM) is to 
control change activity. If, however, SCM is viewed merely as a 
management tool or contractual obligation, it can easily become a 
bureaucratic roadblock that impedes the work. While such systems 
may be contractually required, the real need is to assist the 
programmers in controlling and tracking their work, while ensuring that 
nothing is lost or destroyed. Watts Humphrey; Managing the Sw 
Process; Addison-Wesley, 1989  
Defining the process is the beginning of understanding, implementing it is the 
proof of understanding. To accomplish this DTRA established a top-level working 
group tasked with the responsibility of ensuring the CM for IWMDT is consistent and 
appropriately applied.   
2.  PIWG Directed CM Processes  
DTRA instituted a Product Integration Working Group (PIWG) to oversee the 
configuration management of all Technology Directorate software applications; this 
group is responsible for the top-level CM for IWMDT.  The body is organized in a 
series of working groups tasked with researching and reporting on specific areas of 
interest to the PIWG. According to the DTRA IWMDT Prototype CM Plan Rev 2 the 
IWMDT system is under the CM control of the PIWG. The following directives and 
responsibilities associated with IWMDT are extracted from the CM Plan.   
The DTRA/TD M&S Master Plan and the IWMDT Program Plan establish the 
PIWG as the primary body for; reviewing technical requirements, recommending 
policy, developing processes, and overseeing implementation of the IWMDT. One of 
its duties is to serve as the Configuration Control Board (CCB) for IWMDT, 
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managing the configuration of the IWMDT and reviewing all requested changes to 
configurable items. The PIWG determines and approves all schedules, policies, 
procedures, and directives relating to CM.   
PIWG duties also include the following; determination of baseline version 
release, determination of installation sites, approval of requirement additions, 
deletions, or changes Change Requests, Problem Reports, and design change 
requests (PRs, CRs, DCRs). Within the CM task are a series of supporting tasks 
including, approve CM-controlled documents and document changes, and approval 
of the Verification and Validation (V&V) Plan. Because approving fixes in the IWMDT 
product must occur as problems are discovered, the PIWG may approve 
development work via Email. Regardless of the method there are distinct areas that 
the PIWG is responsible for controlling. 
3. Software Configuration Items 
Under the PIWG three broad areas were identified to manage IWMDT 
products. The three configuration item types, which the CM process controls, are: 
software items, documentation items, and miscellaneous items.  
In accordance with working level IWMDT documentation, the first type, 
software items is described as shown below. Software items consist of three 
categories of software: (1) COTS software, such as web servers, database engines, 
etc. that provide generic functionality to the IWMDT, (2) externally-developed 
software (developed outside of DTRA or within DTRA but separately of the IWMDT) 
such as MEA, HPAC, and INCA, that provide WME-specific functionality, and (3) 
software developed by/for DTRA specifically to provide WMET-specific functionality 
as a web-based application.  
Because much of the software under the IWMDT architecture is either 
category 1 or category 2, which is externally maintained, the IWMDT CM plan only 
covers category 3.  Appendix C contains a list of all Computer Software 
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Configuration Items (CSCIs)27 that make up the IWMDT software. To facilitate the 
concurrent development of disparate pieces of IWMDT, PIWG has directed multiple 
baselines may exist simultaneously. 
 Figure 24 displays a notional relationship of the simultaneous baselines 
within the development activities and the CM process. The CM Plan specifies that 
the PIWG will make a determination as to when new features are to be frozen, and 
the developers will only work on fixing problems and finalizing a release. Following a 
formal beta test where a software beta version is numbered (e.g., Version 5.3 Beta 
1), the PIWG finalizes the expected release date, and determines which PRs are to 
be fixed by the release. For example, the PIWG may request that all PRs associated 
with certain functionality be fixed unless specifically rejected by the PIWG prior to 
acceptance. 
 
Figure 24.    Flow of Configuration Item Data in Baselines. 




                                            
27  Appendix C of this document 
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B. VALIDATION, VERIFICATION AND ACCREDITATION (VV&A) 
The field of validation and testing is a very broad field with a myriad of 
standards and methods. Across this myriad is a common thread, which generally 
asserts that Models and Simulations (M&S) credibility is measured by the V&V 
process and approved through the accreditation process. Employing these 
processes serves a number of purposes. Select reasons to employ VVA are: it 
provides increased confidence in the model, reduces the risk of using the model, it 
provides developers a means to contain cost, potentially it provides better analysis 
and it can satisfy policy requirements by expanding users training activities. Though 
the IWMDT is only a prototype and is not in compliance with many of the prescribed 
DoD standards or methods, they are more concerned with sound engineering than 
most of the previous efforts.  
Appendix A is the Department of Defense INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5000.61, 
dated May 13, 2003, which addresses DoD Verification, Validation and 
Accreditation.  Within this instruction are some very important directions, which 
address the authority and responsibility of Component Commands, and DoD 
sponsors.  Additionally it instructs that VVA be incorporated into the life-cycle 
management of all models and simulations commensurate with their relative 
importance and risk.   
Much of this thesis highlighted the risk of linguistic discontinuity when 
discussing terms and concepts. Our research indicates that it is not linguistic 
discontinuity but ignorance of the definitions that cause improper use of the three 
key words discussed in this section. The three key words; “validation”, “verification” 
and “accreditation”, each have a very clear definition. And this clear definition is 
often confused with “correct”, which can be described in terms of the ability of a code 
block to hold to specified pre-conditions. 
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Figure 25.   Dependencies between V&V related terms.28 
 
According to Neil Storey 29, validation is the process of determining that a 
system is appropriate for its purpose.  This is an important definition that is very 
often misstated and misapplied by users and software experts. This is not a case of 
linguistic discontinuity; this is a case of incorrect use of the phrase. The incorrect 
usage most often used is “testing the software to ensure it does not crash” sic.  This 
is neither a proper use of the term or an accurate process that is repeatable.  A more 
accurate application of the term would be ensuring that an application conforms to a 
specified level of accuracy when its outputs are compared to an aspect of reality.   
The key to validation is the appropriateness of the software not the functionality of 
the system. The solution is not a measure of “goodness”; it is only a measure of the 
difference between the model and the real world. 
Neil Storey’s definition of verification is the process of determining that a 
system, or module, meets its specification. It should be noted that the key in 
verification is not the appropriateness but the functionality. As is true with the 
incorrect use of validation, verification is incorrectly used with the same definition, 
“testing the software to ensure it does not crash” sic. The key here is that the 
software meets all the specifications as stated.  
 
                                            
28 “Generalized Process For The Verification And Validation Of Models And Simulation Results” , 
Dirk Brade, 2004 
29    “Safety-Critical Computer Systems”, Addison-Wesley, 1996, ISBN: 0-201-42787-7 
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An example is “create folders on the IWMDT server <SRS-CA-16-d><IWMDT 
CA-VT-197-d>”. If the system is able to create a folder on the server it has met its 
specification. If the software is not capable of meeting the specification it is fails the 
verification and must be corrected prior to release. 
The final definition of the three is accreditation, Storey does not specifically 
refer to this term, and instead he addresses certification. The difference is subtle so 
we include certification definition first to allow us to be consistent with Storey on all 
three terms. Storey defines certification as convincing an external regulating body 
that the system is safe..”.  According to DoDD 5000.59 accreditation is “the official 
certification that a model or simulation is acceptable application”.  The process is not 
to convince the regulating body that it is safe, the focus is on convincing the body 
that it meets its original specifications.  Ideally the certifying official should be 
involved in the process as early as possible to better understand the requirements. 
Because the accreditation is based on the specific application of the application, it is 
possible that the code could be accredited for one use and not valid for a second 
use.  
 
C. SYSTEM AND DATA SECURITY  
The security of the data should be viewed from a number of perspectives. On 
the most elementary level is data integrity. According to Storey30 , data integrity can 
be defined as: the ability of a system to prevent damage to its own database and to 
detect, and possible correct, errors that do occur.  Data integrity is always important 
but if the user is not familiar with the expected results the integrity of the data is 
much more critical. Operators of IWMDT (or the predecessor stand-alone 
components of IWMDT) rarely understand the agent definition or algorithm process; 
they merely understand how to use the tool. Because users usually understand only 
the tool use, they do not have an experienced perspective on acceptable results. 
The users are not able to consistently identify data errors or potential data 
                                            
30   “Safety-Critical Computer Systems”, Addison-Wesley, 2001, ISBN: 0-201-42764-7 
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inconsistency without this strong domain background. This lack of background is 
likely to cause the typical user to be unable to create unique material definition files. 
The typical user is a first-responder or warfighter whom may be familiar with the tool 
but knows very little about the dynamics of agents in the atmosphere. The media 
has so mystified the terms associated with WME that most people are not familiar 
with the basic elements associated with WME assessment.  
According to source documents DTRA is only performing minimal security 
effort. Because it is a prototype with a sure future it is important to follow as many 
security standards as possible, but not enough to slow down the prototype process. 
Initial security effort is limited to31: partial DITSCAP- only prepare for certification 
and accreditation, execute security readiness review (SRR) scripts on IWMDT 
baseline, provide security guidance on ‘as solicited’ basis, and encourage active 
team participation in all aspects of information and procedural security awareness. 
This issue will be addressed in future development efforts as funding is provided and 
DoD guidance is clarified. 
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VI. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
A. PERCEIVED INCONSISTENCIES 
The author’s experience has taught him that if we want reams of feedback the 
best time to gather it is not when we are trying to solve a problem, but instead 
shortly after we have made our decision. Everyone is a critic after one has made a 
decision, yet there always seems to be a void of good ideas when one needs them 
to make the decisions. In many ways this continues to be true in the development of 
the IWMDT architecture. For over a year as the pleas for input were openly 
requested the masses seemed quiet, but as the development approaches a release, 
the critics are many.  
Not to complain, any productive comment is always useful, but not always 
appropriate for the place and time that one may receive it. The continued migration 
of source code and introduction of new system variables is introducing potential risk 
for faults in IWMDT. Users and development partners because of the dormant 
nature of much of the introduced code and algorithms still hotly contest much of the 
perceived “fault” introduction in this HPAC that is carried forward into IWMDT. As a 
direct factor of the complexity of the code it is highly likely that two trained users will 
get different answers in the same exact scenario because of minor procedural 
techniques. Though seen as a fault by many because it is perceived to have 
dormant faults that could cause errors that are not easily identified or traceable by 
the user, others see it as a flexible implementation of necessary variables.  
Obviously because a code allows users to enter inconsistent data does not 
automatically classify it as unsafe.  The dormant fault and potential error certainly is 
represented in the definition “fault” but because it operates correctly if correct 
information is entered it is not a system fault. Further complicating the reengineering 
effort was an understanding that this tool would be used by different countries, 




The broad user base introduces different safety-criteria both from an 
assessment requirements perspective as well as from the operational perspective. 
Therefore, the HPAC engineers had to consider the applicable differences in their 
analysis of the system design.  
To address these issues and many others, DTRA continues to conduct 
scores of user reviews, user testing events and independent live-fire tests and wind 
tunnel test to validate various pieces of the code and operational model. As the code 
becomes more broadly accepted and users are better educated arguments 
illustrating “faults” are rapidly replaced by the naysayer with the charge that the code 
design is unsafe.  
Some adversaries even claim that the design encourages unsafe operator 
errors as a result of the GUI design openness. In response to the “openness” of the 
GUI, DTRA developed a series of defaults that improved the system integrity by 
providing “smart defaults”. The “smart defaults” were set up on a template basis, 
which changes color on the screen if modified. This enables the operator to easily 
reset his factors if modified to an approved and tested weapon-target set of data.  
The concept of “failsafe” entries is used to a lesser degree prohibiting 
impossible combinations of variables, while still allowing implausible combinations. 
The engineering logic used to develop the smart defaults and the limited “failsafe” 
entries is sound represents much research, live field tests, and controlled 
experiments. The debate will continue, the best path forward is to continue to 
validate the results against reliable data, provide quality assessments and work with 
the users for evolving requirements. 
Before discussing specific aspects of the architecture and performance it is 
important to note that although IWMDT is designed in accordance with the users’ 
requirements, and the software is functional within the intended environment, there 
will still be implementation issues. In some Commands, it is possible that the local 
security constraints or local common operating picture (COP) software may refuse to 
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share data that is critical for IWMDT. Understanding this possibility, IWMDT is 
intentionally establishing robust data storage areas to provide SMEs forward a 
repository of approved models and templates. This is an important point for the 
developer to consider when assessing the architecture. The ability of the user to 
implement our design even if correctly designed may still be an issue in many 
instances. 
 
B. GENERAL GUI DISCUSSION 
Because DTRA products enjoy a degree of familiarity among most CBRNE 
users, it would be assumed that IWMDT navigation would take advantage of the 
familiarity. But the author did not find that to be the case. The author who is familiar 
with the previous tools, web page delivery, CBRNE information and data access was 
still confused when first using the tool. Many suggestions are currently being 
reviewed to improve the interface. One of the leading options is the standardization 
of all screens with one format. Though this will have an immediate benefit of 
assisting the user with consistency it will undoubtedly force the navigation for some 
tools. Not all the tools that are currently integrated and certainly not the future ones 
not scoped will be capable of using one interface. This is an issue that must be story 
boarded and a technical solution must be found before this project goes further. It is 
imperative that the user not be forced to reduce his capability only to meet an 
interface standard. The full strength of integrated capabilities must be exercised. The 
creative GUI must accommodate this growth.   
The current navigation flow encourages users to move right to left and top to 
bottom, but this is not necessarily intuitive. The initial expectation is that the user is 
familiar with previous tools and they will intuitively move from right to left and top to 
bottom, with some minor coaching this probably is not a large leap of faith. The 
designers took special effort to ensure that they provided a capability-based 
approach, which encourages users to use similar processes from other aspects of 
their jobs that involve similar processes. 
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By taking a capability-based approach users may create their own 
customized web layout that facilitates quick access to IWMDT capabilities. Providing 
this option may alleviate many of the concerns over the GUI format. The initial 
operational capability (IOC) is focused on weaponeering and consequence 
assessment capabilities, with additional focus on traditional tool-based usage 
facilitated over a web interface.  
The IWMDT concept of support is shown in Figure 26, the key to the diagram 
is the reliance on the definition of rules for the components of the IWMDT to 





A body of rules and services to enable effective,

















































Figure 26.    IWMDT Concept of Support. 





C. COE DISCUSSION 
IWMDT uses the following COE Version 4.7 Build Lists32 for Windows 2000 
and Solaris 8 specifications. These formats are specifically used to comply with the 
COE system requirements.  
 
• Java 2 Standard Edition (J2SE)  Java Development Kit (JDK) version 1.4.1 





• Microsoft SQL Server (Windows 2000 only) 
• Oracle RDBMS 
• Sybase 
• Apache HTTP Server 
• Jakarta Tomcat Servlet Engine 
• BEA WebLogic 
• Netscape Directory Server 
• Netscape Enterprise Server 
• Netscape Browser 
• Websphere 
• Joint Mapping Toolkit (JMTK) 
 
The COE guidelines are strict in respect to build list use. In all cases where 
the functionality is required and software on the build list meets the requirement, the 
software must be used. Despite this strict inclusion policy and the call for use of the 
JMTK, DTRA chose not to use the JMTK. Instead they are using the commercial 
JMTK as noted earlier in the thesis in order to be commercially viable and more 
visible.  
 
D. DEPLOYMENT OPTIONS 
Though the primary deployment method envisioned for IWMDT is through the 
use of a web-browser as the GUI and remote databases as the source data, other 
methods are expected. The method with the most promise for continued use is 
through the shared web-services approach. This approach is not a manual user 
                                            
32 Available online at http://www.disa.mil/coe/coeeng/RELEASE_PAGES/Ver47pg.html. 
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method using a GUI; it relies on industry standard interface exchanges through the 
various web-services technologies. The author is confident that the greatest benefit 
to the warfighter and first responder community will be the use of this method.  In 
most cases the stand-alone HPAC, IMEA and nuclear tools applications may remain 
the best way for many users to execute the CBRNE mission. For many reasons 
including the local control, not requiring on Internet connectivity, local speed and 
many other factors, the current standalone will remain a viable method.  
Implementing a distributed method of installation indicates that some portion 
of the storage or computational effort is performed by a different system. Standalone 
operation means that all necessary computation and capabilities are available on the 
local machine that is required for operation of the software. In both cases the 
external use of weather is preferred in some instances, this is not indicative of 
method type as it is not a requirement.  
1. Distributed 
IWMDT is designed for accessibility through a variety of distributed 
combinations. These combinations are distinguished by the burden of requirement 
on the client. The browser client configuration shown in Figure 27 has the lowest 
requirement on the client. The only requirement on the client is to have a standard 























Figure 27.   Web browser distributed deployment. 
(FROM, IWMDT Project Management Briefings, 2003) 
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2. Local/Distributed Combination 
A second option is allowing the user to install application clients on their local 
machine.  In this configuration the clients access computational models either 
installed on the same machine as shown in Figure 28 or installed on a remote server 
as shown in Figure 29. The use of the same business logic, resource managers and 
computational object library as the browser-based client configuration is a core 
requirement of the distributed methodology.  Identical processes ensure the 
necessary consistency of the tool and the integration of databases. Additionally it 
allows task sharing between the local and remote processors if required by the user.  
The standalone application cannot inadvertently allocate and monopolize an item 






































Figure 28.   Application client accessing local objects, remote database. 


























Figure 29.   Application client accessing remote objects. 
(FROM, IWMDT Project Management Briefings, 2003) 
 
3. Standalone 
As stated earlier, this configuration relies on the total required code be 
installed on the local machine without a requirement for external processes. This 
configuration causes extreme requirements on the local machine for space and 
processing ability. The local storage requirement is quite often as high as 4GB of 
programs and data, and escalates for additional terrain and map files. Though it has 
the greatest burden on the use, it provides the greatest flexibility. Without relying on 
external processes the system is functional virtually anywhere in the world. Once 
again the processes are performed locally, the databases may be accessed 


















Figure 30.   Standalone installation. 
(FROM, IWMDT Project Management Briefings, 2003) 
 
E. IWMDT ALIGNMENT WITH HF INITIATIVE 
The greatest measure of success for the IWMDT is the ability to integrate 
their services and data into a shared global data infrastructure. DTRA has chosen to 
accomplish this task through the integration of IWMDT into the Horizontal Fusion 
effort. The author created the following chart to highlight the current status of the 
IWMDT program as it pertains to the HF initiatives. All the data in the chart is elicited 
in one of three documents distributed by the HF team.33 The evaluations are largely 
the opinion of the author with limited input from the IWMDT development team. This 
is not representative of the IWMDT program manager’s assessment.  
John Steibet, the CIO for Assistant Secretary for Defense, Network and 
Information Integration Office, (ASD/NII) advanced the HF portfolio. The goal is to 
integrate and optimize technology and operations to achieve “Power to the Edge” in 
the new battlespace.  On the next page is how the chief architect John Osterholz 
describes this new opportunity34: 
“The difference between previous attempts at interoperability and now is that 
– with emergent technologies – global reach and rapid movement of critical 
battlespace knowledge mean that true interoperability is actually possible.” 
 
 
                                            
33  http://horizontalfusion.dtic.mil/, Jun 2004 
34  Horizontal Fusion Initiative document, Feb 2004 
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According to source documents, Osterholz claims this is possible because of 
many of the technologies discussed in this thesis, but additionally hardware and tool 
partners the portfolio is integrating. The Horizontal Fusion Portfolio Initiative was 
undertaken by DoD’s Office of ASD/C3I/CIO to accelerate the transition of Net-
Centric War fighting from vision to reality.  
The key governing imperatives to success are identified by the Portfolio 
Manager as; Horizontal Fusion is focused on the building of a services-oriented 
architecture which supports DoD Operations (SIPRNet), core enterprise services 
must be leveraged, MANDATORY use of Net-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES) 
Security Services (NSS) to authenticate users as per the specification, 
MANDATORY to label all data/XML/SOAP requests with relevant classification 
information, and MANDATORY to restrict access (where applicable) based on that 
user’s attributes.  
DTRA is currently aligning their software development practices to adhere to 
the principles of Horizontal Fusion, with a goal of integrating with the Portfolio in 
2005. Accomplishing this task requires DTRA to address the broad requirements 
established by the ASD/NII office for inclusion in the HF future development and 
integration efforts. Specifically HF requires planning and integration of existing 
projects to ensure a smooth integration with the Global Information Grid (GIG). By 
integrating tools and providing an open architecture, DTRA enables the posting and 
processing of data in a more timely and consistent manner. The key to this 
integration is the definition and integration of the web-services in compliance with 
the intended systems. The author staffed the following Statement of Work amongst 
the IWMDT team and presented it to the Government for official action. Within the 
narrative is the real analysis of this tool and the applicability to other programs. If 
accepted for entry then the items not addressed above must be addressed to make 
this a viable web-service oriented applications. Figure 31 shows the concept 
overview slide (OV1) for the existing IWMDT application framework. This overview 




Figure 31.   IWMDT OV-1 Diagram 
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F. CONCLUSION 
Vision is the key to innovation, and DTRA has demonstrated enough vision to 
develop a prototype that will be capable of meeting existing and projected CBRNE 
requirements. The veracity of their claims and the resoluteness of their focus will be 
borne out in the next six to twelve months. Over this period the program will either 
prove its technical merit or it will fail and DTRA will attempt another solution.  Over 
the period of writing this thesis, a myriad of engineers, and managers have 
influenced the IWMDT effort, too many to capture. But the future will not be defined 
by the individuals it will be defined by the teamwork of a small handful of government 
leaders and contractors with the vision and skills to develop on the edge of 
technologies and emerging requirements. 
The IWMDT effort represents the cooperative engineering approach of over 
100 separate engineers and managers with limited budget, loosely scoped 
requirements and uncertain support, to this end the effort is already a success. This 
has been accomplished and the resulting applications and integration capabilities 
will emerge in the near future. The technical goal was to meet deployable CBRNE 
users requirements in their daily preparation, execution and post analysis of CBRNE 
threats, within the next twelve months this will be tested and the author is confident it 
will be measured effective. 
Through the innovative web-services based approach and the disciplined 
adherence to standards and common formats, this program is postured to succeed 
in many areas. These areas will commonly require rapid, accurate and accessible 
data and specifically tailor the tool to meet their other unique requirements. The 
future of CBRNE assessment looks a lot like IWMDT, though the cover may change, 
the book will read the same.  
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APPENDIX B. SPECIFIC IWMDT DATA FORMATS 
  
 
Inputs Units Limits Defaults 
Name N/A 50 characters  
Map N/A List of available maps  
HPAC Project Name N/A Available HPAC projects (use internal project) 
Notes N/A 50 lines  
Attachments N/A Files, images, web page links  
Table 4. Sessions Inputs 
 
Inputs Units Limits Defaults 
Name N/A 50 characters  
Notes N/A 50 lines  
Attachments N/A Files, images, web page links  
Table 5. CA Folders Inputs 
 
Inputs Units Limits Defaults 
Name N/A 50 characters  
Type N/A CBWPN, CBFAC, NWPN CBWPN 
Location  N/A (See section ) N/A 
Date/Time  N/A (See ) N/A 
Notes N/A 50 lines  
Attachments N/A Files, images, web page links  









Inputs Units Limits Defaults 
Munition N/A 100 kg Bomb, 250 kg Bomb, 500 kg Bomb, Rocket, 
Aerial Spray, 152 mm Tube, 122 mm Rocket, 120 
mm Mortar, Missile Bulk, Missile Subs, Ground 
Spray, Land Mine 
100 kg 
Bomb 
Delivery System N/A 1 AC * 2 Drops * 4 Bombs, 2 AC * 8 Bombs, 4 AC 
* 8 Bombs, 1 AC * 48 Rockets, 2 AC * 48 Rockets, 
Battery (tube), Battalion (tube), Battery (rocket), 
Battalion (rocket), Mortar 36 Rounds, Mortar 72 
Rounds, Aerial Spray, Missile Bulk, Missile Subs, 
Ground Spray, Land Mine 
1 AC * 2 
Drops * 4 
Bombs 
Agent N/A GA, GB, GD, GF, HD, VX, TGA, TGD, TGF, THD, 
TVX, ANTH, BOTX, SEB, PLAGUE, QVF, RICIN, 
SPOX, TUL 
GA 
Mass Kg > 0 to 100,000 100.0 
Table 7. Chemical Weapon Inputs 
Inputs Units Limits Defau
lts 
Damage N/A Light, Moderate, Severe, Total Severe 
Agent N/A ac, acetocya, acrolein, acryloni, allylalc, allylam, allylch, ammonia_liq, 
ammonia, anth_dry, anth_wet, arsine, bg_dry, bg_wet, bortribr, bortricl, 
bortrifl, botx_dry, botx_wet, bt_dry, bt_wet, carbonsu, cg, chlorfrm, chloroac, 
chloroni, chlorsul, ck, cl2_liq, cl2, cn, crbnmnxd, crotonhy, cs, css, dep, 
diborane, diisprplmn, diketene, dimethhz, dimethsu, ethdibr, ethyloxi, fluorine, 
formalde, ga, gb, gd, gf, hbr, hcl, hcn, hd, hs, hse, ironpetl, lewisite, malathion, 
methane, methclfo, mthisocn, mthsulcl, mthybmde, mthyclsi, mthylmcp, 
mtylhzne, nbutiso, nitrdiox, nitricac, parathion, phos5fl, phosgene, phosphin, 
phostricl, phsoxycl, plague_dry, plague_wet, propane, qvf_dry, qvf_wet, 
ricin_dry, ricin_wet, seb_dry, seb_wet, selehexa, sf6, silitetr, spox_dry, 
spox_wet, stibine, styrene, sulfacid, sulfcl, sulfdxde, tellhexa, tep, toldiiso, 
toluene, trctylcd, trifchrd, tul_dry, tul_wet, tunghexa, vee_dry, vx 
ac 
Mass Kg 0 to 100,000,000 1000 
Table 8. Chemical/Biological Facilities Inputs 
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Table 9. CBwpn Munition/Delivery/Agent Matrix 
 
 
Inputs STR / STK Units Limits Defaul
ts 
Strike File Type N/A N/A STR, STK STR 
Placement STK N/A Standard, Buried, Contained Standard 
Yield STR / STK KT > 0 10 
HOB STR / STK feet  0 
PA STR  % 0 to 100 0 
CEP STR  feet > 0 0 
FF STR / STK N/A 0.0 to 1.0 1.0 
Delfic Rise N/A N/A TRUE, FALSE TRUE 




Inputs Units Limits Defaults 
Name N/A 50 characters  
Plot Type N/A Default, Surface Dosage, Probability of Casualty, 
Probability of Mortality, Casualty Table 
Default 
Agent N/A Select from agents involved in existing CB incidents. 
Not applicable for Plot Type = Default. 
 
Time N/A Last Last 
Table 11. CB-type Plot Inputs  
  
Inputs Units Limits Defaults 
Name N/A 50 characters  
Plot Type N/A Blast Circle, Prompt Circle, Thermal Circle, 




Time N/A Last Last 
Table 12. Nuclear-type Plot Inputs 
 
Inputs Units Limits Defaults 
Name N/A 50 characters  
Type Of Points N/A Stationary, Moving Stationary 
Type Of Track N/A GND, AIR, SUB GND 
Threat N/A UNK, FRD, HOS, NEU UNK 
Comments N/A N/A  











Inputs Units Limits Defaults 
Coordinate Units N/A Geodetic (ddd.ssss), Geodetic (ddd mm 






90.0000S to 90.0000N or, 
90 00 00.00S to 90 00 00.00N 
0.0000 N or 




180.0000E to 180.0000W or, 
180 00 00.00S to 180 00 00.00W 
0.0000 E or 0 
00 00.00E 
Elevation feet 0 to 100,000 0 
Datum N/A See list in  WGS-84 
Table 14. Geodetic Location Inputs 
 
 
Inputs Units Limits Defaults 
UTM Zone N/A 1 to 60 31 
UTM Hemisphere N/A N, S N 
UTM Easting meters 100,000 to 900,000 166021 
UTM Northing meters 0 to 10,000,000 0 
Elevation feet 0 to 100,000 0 
Datum N/A See list in  WGS-84 
Table 15. UTM Location Inputs 
Inputs Units Limits Defaults 
MGRS Zone N/A 1-60 31 
MGRS Zone Letter N/A A-Z (except I and O) N 
MGRS Grid Designator N/A AA-ZZ AA 
MGRS Easting meters 0 to 100,000 66021 
MGRS Northing meters 0 to 100,000 00000 
Elevation feet 0 to 100,000 0 
Datum N/A See list in  WGS-84 





































APPENDIX C. CSCI BY IWMDT VERSION 
 





Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency 
DTRA/TDOS 
6801 Telegraph Rd. 
Alexandria, VA 22310 
DTRA/TDOS 
LTC William Harman 
6801 Telegraph Rd. 
Alexandria, VA 22310 







Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency 
DTRA/TDOC 
6801 Telegraph Rd. 
Alexandria, VA 22310 
DTRA/TDOC 
Ron Meris 
6801 Telegraph Rd. 
Alexandria, VA 22310 
Phone:  (703) 325-0608 




Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency 
DTRA/TDNE 
6801 Telegraph Rd. 
Alexandria, VA 22310 
DTRA/TDNE 
Gene Stokes 
6801 Telegraph Rd. 
Alexandria, VA 22310 








Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency 
DTRA/TDOI 
6801 Telegraph Rd. 
Alexandria, VA 22310 
DTRA/TDOI 
Dave Myers 
6801 Telegraph Rd. 
Alexandria, VA 22310 
Phone:  (703) 325-6883 
Email:  Todd.Hann@DTRA.mil 
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